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TEACHING TO THE TEST 
DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE TEST FOR 
FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO “NO 






 Under the current tests set out in Pickering and its 
progeny, teachers—particularly LGBT and LGBT allies—
are being censored in the classroom with “no promo homo” 
education policies and laws. Although citizens are 
granted free speech protections through the First 
Amendment, public employees such as public school 
teachers generally receive less protection. The Supreme 
Court has yet to determine a distinct test for public school 
teachers, leaving discretion to school districts. Currently, 
in seven states, legislators explicitly prohibit teachers 
from positively speaking about or correcting 
misconceptions on homosexuality. In this current age, 
these policies negatively impact the teacher’s effectiveness 
inside of the classroom by distributing sometimes false or 
                                               
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, The University of Tennessee 
College of Law; A.B. Political Science; A.B.J. Mass Media Arts, 
University of Georgia. 
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misleading information and contributing to a hostile 
environment for both teachers and students. This article 
suggests one standard that accounts for the new 
recognition of same-sex rights as a matter of public policy 
and prohibits viewpoint discrimination.  
 
I. Introduction 436 
II. “No Promo Homo” Laws and their Effects on  
       Schools  439 
III. The Potential Legal Tests That Apply to “No Promo  
       Homo” Laws 442 
   A. Connick and Pickering 442 
   B. Garcetti 446 
   C. Tinker 448 
IV. Analysis of “No Promo Homo” Laws Under Each  
      Test  450 
   A. Connick and Pickering 450 
   B. Garcetti 453 
   C. Tinker 455 




Currently, seven states have enacted “no promo 
homo” laws that restrict any school-based instruction or 
activity that could be interpreted as pro-homosexuality.1 
Some of these laws prohibit teachers from positively 
acknowledging homosexuality by stressing that 
“homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general 
public.”2 Others limit teachings of homosexuality as 
source material for AIDs prevention or unhealthy sexual 
habits.3 In doing so, schools relegate homosexuality to a 
                                               
1 “No Promo Homo” Laws, GLSEN, https://www.glsen.org/ 
learn/policy/issues/nopromohomo [https://perma.cc/3LG2-TMFH]. 
2 ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2 (2018).  
3 Id.  
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taboo status. These policies are a matter of strong 
concern for LGBT supporters and families. Many 
teachers feel compelled to teach material that contradicts 
their beliefs and identities.  
 “No promo homo” policies were initially created to 
supplement sexual health education in prevention of 
AIDs. Many of the laws were created in the late ‘80s or 
‘90s, yet have not been updated to match the 
technological advancements and legal decisions in light 
of Obergefell and Lawrence.4 Texas’s policy teaches “that 
homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general 
public and that homosexual conduct is a criminal offense 
under Section 21.06, Penal Code.”5 In Lawrence v. Texas, 
the Supreme Court held criminalizing homosexuality 
under Section 21.06 unconstitutional.6 Other states 
demean homosexuality as a means to prevent contraction 
of AIDS. However, these practices invoke a fallacy and 
stigma within students. The curriculum negates the fact 
that heterosexual individuals may also contract AIDS 
and, generally, LGBT individuals will not all contract the 
disease. “No promo homo” laws should be repealed 
because they teach students outdated curriculum and 
instigate unconstitutional practices. 
 “No promo homo” laws also raise serious First 
Amendment concerns for teachers and students alike. 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.”7 As a matter of policy, courts defer to 
school districts to have broad authority in writing 
curriculum and encouraging social norms unless there is 
                                               
4 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-716 (2018); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 70, § 11-103.3 (West 2018); ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2 
(2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-171 (West 2016); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 59-32-30 (2016); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584 (2015); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
5 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 163.002 (West 2017).  
6 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79.  
7 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
9
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2 
 
[438] 
a lack of sufficient justification for the restriction.8 The 
Supreme Court has recognized students’ right to receive 
ideas and has barred explicit regulations—such as 
removing books from the school’s library—that constitute 
viewpoint discrimination without legitimate 
justification.9 “No promo homo” laws violate both teacher 
and students’ rights, but this article will discuss the 
ramifications for teachers.  
 Unfortunately, the Court has not clearly 
designated protection for teacher speech discussing 
sexual orientation in schools. School districts reason that 
allowing teachers to discuss homosexuality in a positive 
light is inappropriate because it will encourage students 
to become gay and disrupt school operations. This 
justification is insufficient because recent data has 
shown that “no promo homo” laws create an environment 
of intolerance that causes disorder in school. The harmful 
effects of “no promo homo” laws on all aspects of school 
operations reveal the necessity for a clear test to 
determine teachers’ First Amendment rights. It is 
unclear as to whether teacher speech regarding this topic 
is subjected to analysis under Connick-Pickering, 
Garcetti, or Tinker. Part II of this article will discuss the 
three tests. Part III will analyze the facts under each test 
and predict the likely outcome of LGBT teachers’ claims. 
Finally, Part IV will conclude with the appropriate test 
for these claims. 
 
  
                                               
8 See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 
2010); Ronny Hamed-Troyansky, Erasing “Gay” From The 
Blackboard: The Unconstitutionality of “No Promo Homo” 
Education Laws, 20 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 85, 92–94 
(2016).  
9 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–67 (1982) (plurality 
opinion). 
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II. “No Promo Homo” Laws and their Effects on 
Schools 
 
 Anti-gay education policies facilitate an intolerant 
culture by barring teachers from speaking positively of 
homosexuality. In 2015, a national survey from GLSEN, 
an organization dedicated to facilitating safe school 
environments for all students, reported that “57.6% of 
LGBTQ students felt unsafe at school because of their 
sexual orientation, and 43.3% because of their gender 
expression.”10 Students turn to staff for counseling and 
guidance to rectify their situations. However, the report 
also stated that “63.5% of the students who did report an 
incident said that school staff did nothing in response or 
told the student to ignore it.”11 “No promo homo” laws 
exacerbate these problems by creating a hostile 
environment for students. When students attempt to 
report harassment, teachers are prohibited from acting 
in a way that advocates for LGBT students. 
 “No promo homo” laws leave teachers feeling 
helpless and unable to do their job effectively. Some 
teachers refuse to mention homosexuality altogether. 
This leaves LGBT supporters paralyzed to effectively 
facilitate productive conversations that promote a more 
tolerant student body. Kimberlee Irvine, an 8th grade 
teacher, described an instance in 2013 where “her class 
was discussing a passage in which a character has two 
dads.”12 One student thought that this was a typo which 
created a moment that sidetracked the lesson. The 
                                               
10 JOSEPH G. KOSCIW ET AL., GLSEN, THE 2015 NATIONAL 
SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY: THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER YOUTH IN OUR NATION’S 
SCHOOLS xvi (2015).  
11 Id. 
12 Corinne Segal, Eight States Censor LGBTQ Topics in School. 
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teacher noted that “if I could just answer this, it would 
create understanding.”13 Fast change is needed for the 
sake of students and teachers to solve the tension 
between the legality of addressing homosexuality and 
effectively teaching the curriculum.  
 Due to “no promo homo” laws, both straight and 
LGBT teachers fear retaliatory action from schools for 
speaking positively about LGBT identities. In 2014, Brett 
Bigham, “the first openly gay educator to be named 
Oregon Teacher of the Year” was fired months later after 
he “used the role as a platform to discuss gay rights, 
bullying and suicide prevention.”14 His “district saw it as 
an act of war” and refused his request “to meet with a 
Gay Straight Alliance (GSA) club at the local high school 
about suicide prevention . . . because ‘meeting with those 
students has no value to this district.’”15 However, after 
his speech, Bigham attended another GSA meeting 
where a participant said to him “I feel like what you did, 
you did for me.”16 Although students would benefit from 
reassurance by teachers, “no promo homo” laws outlaw 
any form of positive speech regarding homosexuality. 
Ultimately, “no promo homo” laws criminalize positive 
behavior towards homosexuality by leaving teachers 
open to retaliatory action. 
 “No promo homo” laws help to foster hostility 
towards LGBT students. In 2015, “56.2% of students 
reported hearing homophobic remarks from their 
teachers or other school staff, and 63.5% of students 
                                               
13 Id.  
14 Laura Frazier, Oregon 2014 Teacher of the Year Placed on 




15 Brett Bigham, You Can Be Teacher of the Year and Still Get 
Fired for Being Gay, BETTER EDUC. (Oct. 26, 2017), 
http://educationpost.org/you-can-be-teacher-of-the-year-and-
still-get-fired-for-being-gay/ [https://perma.cc/9PR6-VE4Q]. 
16 Id.  
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reported hearing negative remarks about gender 
expression from teachers or other school staff.”17 By 
legalizing hate, teachers are permitted to discriminate 
against students of all ages for their self-expression 
without facing recourse. On the other hand, teachers 
attempting to reaffirm students and confront their peers 
or other students are unfairly treated or fired. 
Comforting harassed students or mentioning positive 
aspects of homosexuality would constitute promoting 
homosexuality in contrast to the school district’s policies. 
Anti-gay laws transform schools from safe, tolerant 
spaces for learning into hostile, close-minded arenas for 
torment.   
 Current “no promo homo” policies are too general 
and imprecise to legitimately achieve the district’s 
purpose in educating students without disruption 
because they do not specifically instruct teachers on what 
they can and cannot say about homosexuality. Most 
recently, the court in Utah discussed this argument as 
the plaintiff’s sought a repeal of Utah’s anti-gay 
education law. The plaintiffs claimed that “[t]hese 
restrictions constitute[d] impermissible content and 
viewpoint discrimination and also impose[d] an 
overbroad and impermissibly vague restriction on 
protected speech.”18 Both parties dismissed the complaint 
in return for amended legislation that erased the 
prohibition of positive speech regarding homosexuality.19 
Liberals and conservatives supported the act, “noting 
that the revised law continues to promote abstinence 
                                               
17 KOSCIW ET AL., supra note 10, at xvi. 
18 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, 
Equality Utah v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 2:16-CV-01081 (D. 
Utah Oct. 24, 2016); see Ryan Thoreson, Utah Repeals ‘No 
Promo Homo’ Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 21, 2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/21/utah-repeals-no-promo-
homo-law [https://perma.cc/PY5T-MJUF]. 
19 Id.  
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outside of marriage in sex education classes.”20 By 
creating a narrowly tailored education policy that does 
not prohibit positively discussing LGBT identities, school 
districts can still carry out their operations.  
  Efforts to amend “no promo homo” laws without 
litigation have been met with reluctance. In the past, 
Alabama’s law referenced “an anti-sodomy law that ha[d] 
never been repealed, despite a federal ruling.”21 In 2013, 
many LGBT supporters pushed for amending or 
repealing the state policy.22 After four years, “[t]he 
Alabama Department of Education removed this 
language from its curriculum in July, defying the state 
law and deleting it from the department’s content 
standards.”23 It is uncertain whether the same success 
can occur in the other seven states due to limited 
supporters’ resources and tense political climates. 
Litigation would put more pressure on legislative agents 
to quickly create change.  
 
III. The Potential Legal Tests That Apply to “No 
Promo Homo” Laws  
 
A. Connick and Pickering  
 
 Under the Connick-Pickering test, the employee, 
speaking as a citizen, must be commenting on a matter 
of public concern to be entitled to First Amendment 
protection.24 A matter of public concern relates to “issues 
of ‘political, social, or other concern to the community.’”25 
The context, content, and form of the statements 
determine whether the employee is speaking on a matter 
                                               
20 Id.  
21 ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2; Segal, supra note 12. 
22 Segal, supra note 12. 
23 Id.  
24 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).   
25 Id. at 146. 
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of public concern.26  Courts utilize a balancing test when 
applying this standard.27  
 During the late 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed the First Amendment rights of public 
employees to prevent public employers from 
circumventing the Constitution.28 A public employee is 
employed by the government. In Pickering v. Board of 
Education, the Court held that a teacher’s First 
Amendment rights were violated when he was fired for 
releasing a letter criticizing the use of school board 
funds.29  In that case, the school board organized a public 
vote to approve proposals for new school buildings.30 
After several letters were published and the proposal was 
defeated twice, the employee, Mr. Pickering, submitted a 
newspaper article describing the negative effects of the 
board’s indecision on students.31 In response, the school 
board fired Mr. Pickering.32 The board determined the 
letter contained false statements that undermined the 
school’s operations.33 
 The Court defined the general guidelines for 
public employee speech. Under the Pickering test, the 
employee must speak on a matter of public concern as a 
citizen to be entitled to protection under the First 
Amendment.34 A matter of public concern relates to 
“issues of ‘political, social, or other concern to the 
community.”’35 Due to the public nature of the board’s 
                                               
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Stephen Elkind & Peter Kauffman, Gay Talk: Protecting Free 
Speech for Public School Teachers, 43 J.L. & EDUC. 147, 156 
(2014).  
29 391 U.S. 563 (1968).   
30 Id. at 566.  
31 Id.  
32 Id.   
33 Id. at 567.  
34 Id. at 565.   
35 Hamed-Troyansky, supra note 8. 
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vote, the Court considered Pickering’s speech a matter of 
public concern. Next, the public employee must be 
speaking as a citizen to be entitled to First Amendment 
protection. When the teacher’s speech is not knowingly or 
recklessly false, the speech is treated as that of a member 
of the general public.36 The board provided no evidence 
that showed the teacher made his allegedly false 
statements recklessly or knowingly.37 In this case, the 
employee was speaking on a matter of public concern as 
a citizen and was entitled to First Amendment 
protection.  
 The school district attempted to argue that public 
employees gave up their First Amendment rights 
completely while at work. The Court rejected the notion 
that teachers would relinquish their First Amendment 
rights commenting on matters that they would otherwise 
freely exercise as citizens.38 In doing so, the Court 
utilized a balancing test to weigh the school 
administration’s interest in limiting the teacher’s 
opportunities to speak in a public forum with the 
teacher’s interest in making a contribution as a member 
of the general public.39 The Supreme Court recognized 
that the state has a strong interest in maintaining 
operations through its employees.40 The Court noted that 
in some contexts “[t]eachers are, as a class, the members 
of a community most likely to have informed and definite 
opinions.”41 Therefore, teachers’ interest in speaking at 
their workplace was an important interest. The Court 
also acknowledged the importance of a teacher’s freedom 
in speaking on such matters without retaliation.42 
                                               
36 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 583. 
37 Id.   
38 Id. at 568.  
39 Id.  
40 Id.   
41 Id. at 572. 
42 Id.  
16
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Ultimately, the Court held that the state’s interest did 
not outweigh the public citizens’ speech.43 
 For at least 15 years, teachers’ speech had been 
universally protected under the First Amendment.44 In 
Connick v. Myers, the Court modified the Pickering 
analysis and held that the public employee was not 
entitled to protection.45 In Connick, Ms. Myers, an 
Assistant District Attorney, opposed her transfer to 
another location.46 Upon seeing that others did not share 
her same views, Myers released “a questionnaire 
soliciting the views of her fellow staff members 
concerning the office transfer policy.”47 Myers later 
refused to transfer.48 The District Attorney, Connick, 
fired Myers for insubordination that interfered with 
working relationships.49 Myers argued that her First 
Amendment rights had been violated and won in the 
District Court pursuant to Pickering.50 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari after it was affirmed by the court 
of appeals.51  
 The Court reversed, holding that Myers’ speech 
was primarily a matter of private interest, not a matter 
of public concern subject to protection under the First 
Amendment.52 Myers’ speech was a matter of public 
concern “in only a most limited sense” based on a 
determination from the “content, form, and context of a 
given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”53 The 
Court held that speech that is purely personal and does 
                                               
43 Id. at 571–72.  
44 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 140.   




51 Id. at 142. 
52 Id. at 154. 
53 Id. at 147, 154. 
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not include public concern is not protected speech.54 On 
the other hand, Connick’s actions were reasonable due to 
the “disruptive potential” of at least one question.55 
Although aspects of the questionnaire concerned matters 
of public concern, the employer was given deference 
because close-working relationships were vital to 
“fulfilling [the] public responsibilities” of the job.56 
 The Connick Court’s analysis of the statement’s 
context unfairly restricted the  employee’s speech.57 
Justice Brennan reasoned in his dissent that the Court 
incorrectly weighed the context of Myers’ statement 
against the employer’s need to restrict her speech.58 
Myers released the questionnaire at her job, so it created 
the potential for disturbing the work environment.59 
Justice Brennan reasoned that Connick’s fear was 
enough to outweigh the employee’s speech protections.60 
In doing so, the holding arguably robbed the public of 
information crucial to assess elected officials, such as 
operations regarding transfers.61 The Court held that 
Myers’ speech was not protected under the First 
Amendment.62   
 
B. Garcetti  
 
 Furthermore, the Court continued its restriction 
on the First Amendment rights of public employees in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos.63 In Garcetti, the Court held that the 
First Amendment does not protect public employees’ 
                                               
54 Id. at 147.  
55 Id. at 167 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
56 Id. at 168.  
57 See id. 
58 Id. at 157. 
59 Id. at 153 (majority opinion). 
60 Id. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
61 Id. at 170. 
62 Id. at 154 (majority opinion). 
63 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
18
TEACHING TO THE TEST 
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 435 (2019) 
 
[447] 
speech made on the job while serving a duty.64 In 
Garcetti, the plaintiff alleged that he suffered “retaliatory 
employment actions” in response to incriminating 
testimony that he gave while on the job.65 As deputy 
prosecutor, the plaintiff wrote a disposition 
memorandum recommending the dismissal of a case on 
the basis of purported governmental misconduct in 
obtaining a search warrant.66 The Court reasoned that 
Garcetti had no First Amendment protection due to the 
memorandum being written while in his official capacity 
as a public employee.67 Therefore, he was not protected 
from punishment by his supervisors. 
  Unlike private citizens, the opinions of public 
employees may interrupt the efficiency or effectiveness of 
government operations.68 The Government has a 
“heightened interest[] in controlling speech made by an 
employee in his or her professional capacity.”69 Under 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, three conditions must be met to 
determine whether a public employee’s purported speech 
is protected under the First Amendment. First, the 
matter must be of public concern.70 Second, the 
employer’s interests in effectively rendering services to 
the public must outweigh the private citizen’s interest in 
commenting on the matter.71 Third, the employee cannot 
make comments while performing their official duties.72  
 The majority declined to decide whether or not to 
apply this test to teachers because “[w]e need not, and for 
that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we 
                                               
64 Id. at 426. 
65 Id. at 414–15.  
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 421.  
68 Id. at 418. 
69 Id. at 422.  
70 Id. at 418. 
71 Id. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 566, 568 
(1968)).  
72 Id. at 419.  
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conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case 
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”73 
Three dissenting opinions in Garcetti opposed the idea of 
expanding this view to educators in support of a concept 
called “academic freedom.”74 Academic freedom is the 
concept where “teachers necessarily speak and write 
‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”75 In a moment of possible 
foreshadowing to the present issue, Justice Souter’s 
dissent noted that  
private and public interests in addressing . . . threats to 
health and safety can outweigh the government's stake 
in the efficient implementation of policy, and when they 
do public employees who speak on these matters in the 
course of their duties should be eligible to claim First 
Amendment protection.76 
The issue of whether teachers are protected by the 
First Amendment when speaking on public matters while 
on the job is still open.  
 
C. Tinker  
 
 The Court had previously addressed the 
appropriate test for instances when the employer’s fear 
or hesitation leads to an employee’s speech restriction.77 
In accordance with the  Connick-Pickering balancing test, 
the Court may later apply the standard found in Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District to 
analyze speech in school.78 Under Tinker, the Court held 
that the interest to protect employees from retaliation 
                                               
73 Id. at 425.  
74 Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
75 Id. at 438.  
76 Id. at 428.  
77 See generally, Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 566, 568 
(referring to the effort to strike a balance between the interests 
of public citizens and the interests of the state on matters of 
public concern). 
78 393 U.S. 503 (1969).  
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after expressing critiques of public importance will be 
weighed against the employer’s fears of disruption.79 
Unlike Garcetti, the Court will only defer to school 
officials when there is substantial evidence to support 
that the censored speech contradicts the school’s 
mission.80 Additionally, the speech must create a 
material interference with the school’s activities.81 School 
districts may attempt to defend their actions when there 
is a reasonable expectation for disruption by students or 
faculty.82 Speech restrictions will be justified with a 
showing that the prohibition is based on more than a 
“mere desire to avoid the discomfort or unpleasantness 
[of an] unpopular viewpoint.”83 The Constitution 
prohibits viewpoint discrimination that specifically 
targets one side of an opinion that is unaccepted by 
society.84 
 A prohibition singling out a particular viewpoint 
is impermissible under the First Amendment.85 In 
Tinker, the school allowed other students to wear 
different types of political and religious symbols.86 Only 
the students who were protesting with armbands were 
suspended.87 This indicated that the prohibition was only 
for a certain political opinion.88 Provided there is no 
evidence justifying restrictions on speech, students and 
teachers are entitled to freely express their views.89 
Reasonable speech restrictions from public employers 
                                               
79 Id. at 509.  
80 Id. at 513; see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422–23 (noting that in 
general, supervisors must ensure employees’ official 
communications promote the employer’s mission). 
81 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 509.  
84 Id. at 508–09 
85 Id. at 511.  
86 Id. at 510.  
87 Id. at 510–11. 
88 Id. at 511. 
89 See id. 
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must be viewpoint neutral and equally administered to 
all public employees. 
  In Tinker, a school district banned students from 
protesting against the Vietnam War because it feared the 
protests would cause disruptions to school’s activities.90 
The Tinker Court held that a mere fear of disruption is 
not enough to restrict the students’ or teachers’ 
constitutionally-protected speech.91 The school district 
suspended all the students.92 The children and their 
parents argued that the suspension violated their First 
Amendment rights.93 The district court ruled for the 
school district.94 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed 
the decision.95  
 The problem remains regarding Tinker’s 
application to teachers. The Court held that neither 
students nor teachers lose their First Amendment rights 
once they enter a school.96 However, the plaintiffs were 
solely students. Many of the facts and analysis applied to 
students’ speech. Without an explicit limitation to 
students, other courts may use Tinker to analyze teacher 
speech regarding viewpoint discrimination over public 
matters. On the other hand, courts may read this decision 
as narrowly applied to students.  
 
IV. Analysis of “No Promo Homo” Laws Under 
Each Test  
 
A. Connick and Pickering 
  
 LGBT teachers could claim that the standard for 
evaluating their speech needs to be the two-prong 
                                               
90 Id. at 508.  
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 504. 
93 Id. at 505. 
94 Id. at 504–05.  
95 Id. at 514. 
96 Id. at 506.  
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Connick-Pickering test. Following the reasoning in 
Pickering, teachers, especially those that identify as 
LGBT, are able to be well-informed on areas of sexual 
orientation.97 Teachers have a close relationship with 
students and interact with them on a daily basis, so being 
able to speak positively about homosexuality will 
increase their effectiveness. Anti-gay laws threaten 
teachers with retaliation for non-compliance. This is 
exactly the opposite outcome that Justice Marshall and 
the Pickering Court wanted because teachers are legally 
fired for speaking on the matter at their workplace.  
 The freedom to speak positively about 
homosexuality is a matter of public concern. Under the 
Connick-Pickering test, the employee, speaking as a 
citizen, must be commenting on a matter of public 
concern to be entitled to First Amendment protection.98 A 
matter of public concern relates to “issues of ‘political, 
social, or other concern to the community.’”99 The context, 
content, and form of the statements determine whether 
the employee is speaking on a matter of public concern.100 
Recent political and legal events have designated 
homosexuality as a matter of public concern.101 Cases like 
Obergefell v. Hodges recognized the historical 
developments that have addressed the political and social 
concerns of LGBT citizens in both positive and negative 
ways.102 In Obergefell, the Supreme Court noted the 
attitude shifts that have led more LGBT citizens to live 
an open and public lifestyle.103 As a result of Obergefell, 
                                               
97 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 566, 572 (1968). 
98 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 568. 
99 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). 
100 Id. at 147. 
101 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2596 
(2015).  
102 Id.   
103 Id.  
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society has afforded LGBT citizens the same marital 
rights as heterosexual individuals.104  
 Instead, school districts may argue that this 
speech reflects private matters. However, the ability to 
speak positively on homosexuality would not be limited 
to LGBT teachers. There is also no indication that LGBT 
teachers would share intimate information with their 
students when speaking positively about homosexuality. 
Many heterosexual teachers are able to talk positively 
about heterosexual relationships or friendships without 
sharing intimate details. Increasing numbers of students 
come from homosexual families or have LGBT friends. 
Students’ perspectives on issues surrounding family, 
work, and political matters concern public interests, 
regardless of sexual orientation. All teachers should be 
able to speak positively about homosexuality in an 
objective way that separates their personal life from their 
professional job to create a more holistic and empathetic 
understanding in students.  
 Next, the public employee must be speaking as a 
citizen to be entitled to First Amendment protection.105 
As long as teachers do not make knowingly or recklessly 
false statements about homosexuality, their speech is 
treated as that of a member of the general public.106 If 
teachers make knowingly or recklessly false statements, 
they are not speaking as a member of the general public 
and no longer enjoy constitutional protection. The repeal 
of “no promo homo” laws would allow teachers to speak 
truthfully about issues of homosexuality. Similarly to 
Pickering, teachers could claim that they should enjoy 
protection for speech that they would otherwise enjoy as 
a public citizen.107  
 Lastly, the court must weigh the school 
administration’s interest in limiting the teacher’s 
                                               
104 Id.  
105 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).   
106  See id. at 574. 
107 Id. at 565. 
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opportunities to speak in a public forum with the 
teacher’s interest in contributing as a member of the 
general public.108 The state has a strong interest in 
maintaining school operations by regulating its 
teachers.109 However, teachers would have a stronger 
interest in being able to speak on matters without fear of 
retaliation.110 Additionally, teachers could provide 
evidence that they have interests in educating and 
comforting students. It would be difficult for schools to 
show that speaking positively on homosexuality would 
have catastrophic or substantial effects on the operations 
of schools.  
  Generally, if LGBT teachers were to undergo 
analysis under Connick-Pickering test, the courts would 
recognize that teachers’ First Amendment rights are 
protected.111 Currently, teachers who directly contradict 
the anti-gay statutes in place suffer retaliatory action or 
harassment from their peers. These actions would not 
withstand scrutiny under Connick-Pickering because the 
interests of the state do not outweigh the interest to 
protect employees from retaliation for voicing critiques 
that could benefit the community.112 School districts 
must become more tolerant as the rights and privileges 
of LGBT individuals become recognized.   
 
B. Garcetti  
 
 The Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos left the 
question of teacher speech made on school grounds open 
to interpretation. Most circuits have abstained from 
addressing whether teachers are subjected to Garcetti’s 
                                               
108 Id. at 568. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 572. 
111 Pickering, 391 U.S. 563.   
112 Id.  
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analysis.113 Yet, some circuits have applied Garcetti to 
hold that teachers’ First Amendment rights were not 
violated.114 The Supreme Court has not resolved this 
dispute amongst circuits as to whether teachers have 
First Amendment protection when speaking among 
students in their work capacity. A case regarding 
teachers’ rights to positively discuss homosexuality in “no 
promo homo” states could provide a solid affirmative 
answer if the Court proceeds to use either the Connick-
Pickering or Tinker test.  
 However, there is a possibility that the Court will 
extend Garcetti to teacher speech. If so, the Court will 
likely hold that teachers do not have First Amendment 
protection while speaking on the job, regardless of 
whether the matter is of personal concern. The teachers 
would likely lose because they are speaking on the job.115 
This prong would restrict protection for every statement 
made during school hours and within the school building. 
School districts would reason that they have a 
heightened interest in controlling speech made by 
employees in their official capacity because it directly 
affects their operations. Teachers may present evidence 
that their speech would address misconceptions or 
supplement the curriculum rather than negatively affect 
their operation. However, teachers are unlikely to 
succeed because schools are essentially “hiring speech” 
that must succumb to their perspectives on 
curriculum.116 
  Courts could restrict the implementation of 
Garcetti’s analysis to limited situations where it is 
                                               
113 See Lee v. York Cty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694 (4th Cir. 
2007); Borden v. Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 153, 171 n.13 (3d Cir. 
2008).  
114 Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 
2011); see Mayer v. Monroe Cty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477 
(7th Cir. 2007).   
115 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).  
116 Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479. 
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essential to restrict teacher’s speech due to the topic’s 
nature.117 However, this need does not apply to 
homosexuality in “no promo homo” states. Restrictions on 
teacher speech that relegate them to only speak 
negatively about homosexuality render teachers 
ineffective in the classroom by damaging the positive 
environment in schools, perpetuating a culture of 
intolerance, and often disseminating outdated and 
misleading information to students. The Garcetti holding 
enables communities to quietly “promote intolerance of 
homosexuality and strip teachers of their constitutional 
right to discuss homosexuality with their students in 
certain situations.”118 
 
C. Tinker  
 
 Teachers would meet more success if the Supreme 
Court used the Tinker analysis.119  Under Tinker, school 
districts may not restrict speech surrounding sexual 
orientation merely because it may cause a disruption.120 
There must be substantial evidence that supports the 
school districts’ belief that the speech conflicts with the 
schools’ mission and that it will cause a material 
disturbance in school activities.121 This is a higher burden 
on school districts to meet. In doing so, the Court may 
determine that some school districts simply do not agree 
with homosexuality. However, the Constitution and legal 
precedent protect speech that may be disliked by the 
masses.122 Teachers may counteract school districts’ 
claims by bringing data that shows the positive 
                                               
117 See Johnson, 658 F.3d at 966; Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479. 
118 Elkind & Kauffman, supra note 28. See Evans-Marshall v. 
Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010). 
119 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969).  
120 Id. at 509.  
121 Id. at 513. 
122 Id. at 509. 
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sentiment towards homosexual enfranchisement or the 
negative impact “no promo homo” policies have on the 
academic, mental, and emotional state of LGBT students.  
 The strongest claim for teachers against “no 
promo homo” laws are those that allege viewpoint 
discrimination. Teachers may assert that “no promo 
homo” laws are not neutral. These policies do not punish 
those who refuse to talk about homosexuality or only talk 
negatively about the topic. Instead, they punish those 
who speak positively about homosexuality, which 
amounts to viewpoint discrimination. This has the 
harmful effect of stifling students’ growth and 
understanding of a controversial topic. On the other 
hand, school districts may counter-argue that the policy 
is nevertheless justified because it is “narrowly tailored 
to further a ‘substantial’ state interest in preventing a 
disruption.”123  Schools may also argue that this 
restriction applies to all teachers and that it does not 
discriminate one viewpoint. However, schools are likely 
to fail this requirement because it only punishes those 
that speak positively about homosexuality.  
 Teachers should be allowed to discuss sexual 
orientation as it pertains to the curriculum to support 
LGBT students because “there is no precedent that LGBT 
advocacy . . . would ever create a disruption sufficient to 
justify this limitation.”124 The Tenth Circuit has 
recognized that speech that “substantially addresses 
LGBT issues” by making “statements aimed at legal and 
political change” are core protected speech under the 
First Amendment.125 This is not to say that teachers 
should be allowed to talk freely about homosexuality at 
any time. Teachers’ speech must be reasonably related to 
                                               
123 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 
37, 71 (1983). 
124 Jillian Lenson, Litigation Primer Attacking State “No Promo 
Homo” Laws: Why “Don't Say Gay” Is Not O.K., 24 TUL. J.L. & 
SEXUALITY 145, 153 (2015). 
125 Id.  
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the schools’ mission and for the purpose of effectively 
running school operations to be protected.   
 
V. Conclusion  
 
 Whether teacher speech is entitled to 
constitutional protection has yet to be addressed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Currently, the Supreme Court has 
not designated a test to apply for teacher speech in 
school. “No promo homo” laws restrict teacher speech 
advocating homosexuality. Without guidance from the 
Supreme Court, lower courts have broad discretion in 
upholding these discriminatory policies.  
 In evaluating public employees’ First Amendment 
rights, the Court has recognized three tests: the Connick-
Pickering test,126 the Garcetti test,127 and the Tinker 
test.128 The Court declined to assess teacher speech under 
the Garcetti test because the question in that case did not 
call for it. As it stands, two of the three choices would 
result in a win for teachers, while one would grant 
deference to school districts without much regard to the 
public nature of the speech. The Supreme Court should 
stand by their original decision and not apply Garcetti to 
“no promo homo” laws.  
 Furthermore, “no promo homo” laws are written 
to impermissibly discriminate against one viewpoint. The 
Garcetti test does not address this issue. On the other 
hand, the Tinker test enables speech that dignifies all 
students by protecting “unpopular” speech that is 
targeted by unjustified restrictions. Currently, teachers 
only face disciplinary action for advocating on behalf of 
their LGBT students. This reasoning strays from the 
Court’s original intention of protecting public employees 
                                               
126 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
127 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
128 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969). 
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from retaliation due to their criticisms and circumvents 
prior Supreme Court decisions. 
 As stated by Equality Utah’s Executive Director 
Troy Williams at the organizations’ annual fundraiser, 
“[t]he time has come to end the stigma and strike ‘no 
promo homo’ from state law.”129 States should allow 
teachers to present ideas on both sides and allow 
students to come to their own conclusions to avoid 
viewpoint discrimination. Teachers should work as 
facilitators to the conversation and attempt to mitigate 
any misconceptions without imposing their own personal 
beliefs upon students to prevent overstepping their First 
Amendment protection. The level of teacher control 
should be dependent on the grade level with more 
guidance being implemented for elementary and more 
facilitation and mediation given in high school courses. 
School districts will survive court scrutiny by 
implementing viewpoint-neutral regulations that enable 
teachers to control the discussion in classrooms while 
validating student identities.  
 
  
                                               
129 Jennifer Dobner, In A National First, LGBT Advocates Sue 
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Public defenders and other court actors most often 
engage in behind-the-scene plea negotiating to manage 
overwhelming workloads and to dispose of cases as 
quickly and efficiently as possible. In prior work, scholars 
have documented an increased reliance on plea 
bargaining and the deleterious impact of the practice on 
the legal process and the rights of individuals accused of 
a crime; however, this research has not systematically 
analyzed the decisions made, and the perspectives of 
justice of society’s most disadvantaged and arguably most 
important actors of the court, the defendants. Relying on 
data collected in a Midwestern public defense system, this 
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article focuses attention to the intersection of indigent 
defense and plea bargaining by shedding light on the 
decision-making processes and perceptions of justice 
among indigent defendants. Our findings indicate that 
regardless of innocence, defendants plead guilty because 
it offers the quickest pathway out of court and with little 
risk; however, misunderstanding and fear often mediate 
decisions to plead guilty. Also, while the majority of 
defendants perceive the plea outcome to be fair, they do 
not always perceive the plea process as fair. 
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 The United States formalized the provision of 
public defense through the passage of the 6th 
Amendment in 1789 and the unanimous ruling by the 
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Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963.1 Since 
this time, attorneys assigned to provide public defense 
services to individuals who are accused of a crime, but 
unable to afford legal counsel, have struggled with 
demanding caseloads and a lack of funding to support 
their work.2 To manage overwhelming workloads, 
defense attorneys and prosecutors engage in behind-the-
scene negotiating to dispose of cases as quickly and 
efficiently as possible.3  Because negotiations result in 
pleas of guilty in over ninety percent of cases, a large body 
of research has considered the implications of plea 
                                               
1 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 344 (1963). While the 
original decision of the Court applied to adult, felony 
proceedings, the mandate has since been extended to 
misdemeanor, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); 
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002), and juvenile 
proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). 
2 See Eve Brensike Primus, Defense Counsel and Public 
Defense, in REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
PROCESSES 121, 121 (Erik Luna ed., 2017); Michael Barrett, 
The Impact of Neglecting Indigent Defense on the Economics of 
Criminal Justice, 61 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 681, 682–86 (2016) (using 
Missouri’s public defender’s system to demonstrate the funding 
issues); ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N. OF 
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The 
Terrible Toll of American’s Broken Misdemeanor Court 26 
(2009), https://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor/ [https:// 
perma.cc/UZ79-VWKH]; NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICAN’S 
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 52–64 (2009), https://constitutionproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GB7-UWZK].  
3 See generally MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE 
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 
(1979); GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A 
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003); PETER F. 
NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978); Donald A. Dripps, 
Guilt, Innocence, and Due Process of Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. 
& MARY L. REV 1343 (2015). 
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negotiations on criminal justice actors, including 
attorneys, prosecutors, and the judiciary.4 Very little 
research, however, has considered the impact of plea 
negotiations on the individuals whose lives are most 
affected by the practice: the defendants.  
 The goal of this research is to examine how the 
practice of plea-bargaining influences indigent defendant 
decision-making, court experiences, and perspectives of 
justice. Research on plea bargaining dates back to the 
1920s and 1930s, prior to the passage of the 6th 
Amendment. Scholarly works by Miller and Moley in 
1927 and 1928, and the publication of the Wickersham 
Commission report in 1931, for example, are highly 
regarded for their early considerations of plea bargaining 
on the legal doctrine of criminal court procedures.5 
Notably, in the first published issue of Southern 
California Law Review, Miller opens an article entitled, 
“The Compromised of Criminal Cases” with the 
statement, “In theory there should be no compromise of 
criminal cases,” but “[i]n practice, [] the condonation and 
compromise of criminal cases is frequent and the 
methods of evading the clear purpose of the written law 
are varied.”6 
Since these early publications, scholars have 
documented an increased reliance on plea bargaining and 
the deleterious impact of the practice on the legal process 
and the rights of individuals accused of a crime. Legal 
advocates argue that because pleas of guilty are 
                                               
4 BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE., FELONY 
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 — STATISTICAL 
TABLES 22, 24 (2013); LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING (2011).  
5 See 4 NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENF’T 
(WICKERSHAM COMM’N), REPORT ON PROSECUTION 95–97 
(1931); Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 
97 (1928); Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1927). 
6 Miller, supra note 5, at 1–2.  
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negotiated and agreed to outside of the courtroom and in 
advance of sentencing, the plea process reallocates 
control over sentencing decisions from the judiciary to the 
prosecution.7 Because cases are so quickly resolved 
through pleas of guilty, evidentiary and legal issues are 
often suppressed and case investigation ceases to exist.8 
The formulaic agreements on which plea bargains rely 
often overlook the identity of those who are accused of a 
crime, and thereby eliminate individualized mitigation 
and consideration of rehabilitative responses.9 Moreover, 
those accused of a crime find themselves pressured into 
admitting guilt for fear of missing an opportunity to 
decrease punishment versus extending the work of the 
court which may result in harsher sentences down the 
road. In 1978, Langbein went so far as to compare plea 
bargaining to torture, stating that although our means 
may be politer—“we use no rack, no thumbscrew, no 
Spanish boot to mash his legs”—we still make it costly for 
an individual accused of a criminal offense to claim their 
constitutional rights.10  
These concerns call attention to the importance of 
understanding the impact of plea bargaining on the 
experiences and perspectives of defendants and, in 
                                               
7 MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 37, 67–68 (1998); 
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2004).  
8 FEELEY, supra note 3.  
9 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing 
Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 
951 (1991) (“These guidelines also mark a changed attitude 
toward sentencing—one that looks to collections of cases and 
to social harm rather than to individual offenders and the 
punishments they deserve.”);  Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, 
Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old 
Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (1989) (“One problem 
underscored in this scholarship is that individual concrete 
human voices and abstract, general legal rules often conflict.”). 
10 John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 3, 12 (1978). 
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particular, those defendants who cannot afford to retain 
legal counsel. Today, indigent defendants compose the 
majority of the criminal justice system, with research 
indicating that between 60 percent and 90 percent of 
defendants rely on court-appointed attorneys.11 In an 
effort to highlight the experiences of the defendants who 
most frequently interact with the criminal courts and the 
plea process, this research utilizes semi-structured 
interview data with defendants and administrative court 
data collected in a Midwestern urban public defense 
system between the years of 2008 to 2011. In the 
following pages, we outline research related to the 
intersection of public defense and plea bargaining, and 
the decision-making process of indigent defendants and 
perceptions of justice, in an effort to better understand 
how criminal court processes are perceived by the 
individuals who are most directly affected by their 
outcomes. Our findings indicate that regardless of 
innocence, defendants plead guilty because it offers the 
quickest pathway out of court and with little risk; 
however, misunderstanding and fear often permeate 
decisions to plead guilty. While the majority of 
defendants perceive the plea outcome to be fair, they do 
not always perceive the plea process as fair.  
 
II. Plea Bargaining in Public Defense 
 
It is well-documented that the plea process has 
become a cornerstone of the criminal justice system in the 
decades since its introduction and indoctrination in the 
late 1700s and 1800s. During this era, criminal justice 
                                               
11 JUSTICE POLICY INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF 
UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENSE 2 (2011); LYNN LANGTON 
& DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC 
DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007—STATISTICAL TABLES (2009); Carol 
J. Defrances & Marika F.X. Litras, Indigent Defense Services 
in Large Counties, 1999, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice), Nov. 2000, at 1. 
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grew into a professional institution, incorporating formal 
police departments and court officials who became 
“repeat players” in criminal cases.12 Accordingly, the 
court workgroup became accustomed to the routine 
disposition of cases, and to the outcomes and sentences 
associated with taking a case to trial versus negotiating 
a plea deal. Once outcomes and sentences of pleas and 
trials became familiar to court actors, a “going rate” of 
the expected sentence developed such that the system 
became routine and bureaucratic and, in doing so, 
increased its capacity to process more cases and at a 
quicker rate.13  
Today, well over 90 percent of criminal cases are 
disposed through pleas of guilty. Most court actors, 
including prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judiciary, 
argue that plea bargaining is a necessary tool in the 
criminal courts, and particularly for those systems that 
are overwhelmed by cases and depleted in resources. 
Arguably, attorneys who are assigned to represent 
indigent defendants are one of the primary groups of 
court actors who are reliant on and benefit from the gains 
afforded by the plea process.14 Since the inception of 
                                               
12 FEELEY, supra note 3; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 149–55 (1993); LAWRENCE 
M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 
1870–1910 (1981); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND 
CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN 
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980). 
13 Jonathan D. Casper, Having Their Day in Court: Defendant 
Evaluations of the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 237 (1978); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: 
THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE 
ATTORNEYS (1981); ROTHMAN, supra note 12. 
14 Feeley and other scholars have argued that the plea process 
is “a mixed-strategy game” in which prosecution and defense 
“share in gains and losses.” FEELEY, supra note 3, at 27. For 
instance, “prosecutor[s] gain[] by securing convictions.” Id. 
Also, “defense gains certainty of outcome, and a reduction of 
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public defense following the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Gideon, the system has struggled with considerable 
challenges that shape the ability of public defenders to 
provide effective defense.15 High caseloads and a lack of 
funding constrain the amount of time that public 
defenders can spend with defendants and conducting 
case investigation.16 Even when attorneys are available 
to meet with defendants, stress related to overwhelming 
workloads may lead public defenders to encourage 
defendants to accept pleas of guilty in order to facilitate 
case resolution.17 In some cases, defendants may be 
approached with plea deals and plead guilty to 
misdemeanor offenses before ever meeting attorneys. A 
significant implication of these practices is that many 
defendants are pleading guilty to a crime without full 
knowledge or understanding of their rights, options, or 
the collateral consequences of the decision.  
 
  
                                               
the sentence.” Id. Further, “the state is also a beneficiary 
because it secures an admission of guilt, punishes the guilty, 
and yet saves the expense of a trial.” Id. 
15See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963) 
(holding that indigent defendants are entitled to 
representation, without indicating an infrastructure to allow 
for such defense); THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 
50–101. 
16 JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 11, at 6. For example, 
although the American Bar Association (ABA) recommends 
that public defenders not exceed national caseload standards, 
many public defenders and, in particular those working in 
urban areas, typically manage double that amount of cases 
annually. SUZANNE M. STRONG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE-
ADMINISTERED INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 2013 at 5 (2016). 
17 SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN INDIANA: 
EVALUATION OF TRIAL LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 
169–70 (2016); NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. SERVS., A RACE TO THE 
BOTTOM: SPEED & SAVINGS OVER DUE PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 39–40 (2008). 
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III. Deciding to Plead Guilty 
 
With approximately 6 million indigent individuals 
receiving public defense services annually, and the 
majority pleading guilty to a crime, it is critically 
important to consider why individuals who are accused of 
a crime decide to accept pleas of guilty. There is little 
theoretical guidance on the decision-making processes of 
defendants; however, there is some support to suggest 
that theories of court worker decision-making may be 
applicable to the decisions that defendants make.  
The extent research on court worker decision-
making offers three theories by which to interpret court 
worker decisions to employ plea bargaining strategies. 
First, organizational efficiency theories argue that 
disparities in sentencing are the result of court actors 
rewarding behavior and attitudes that are valued by the 
institution—because court actors value the time and 
resource-savings afforded by quick pleas of guilty, 
defendants who accept plea bargains are rewarded with 
less severe sentences.18 Albonetti, for example, states, 
“Defendant cooperation exemplified by a willingness to 
plead guilty is viewed, by the sentencing judge, as an 
indication of the defendant’s willingness to ‘play the 
game’ in a routine, system defined manner.” 19 Second, 
theories of uncertainty avoidance argue that defendants 
                                               
18 PETER NARDULLI, JAMES EISENSTEIN & ROY B. FLEMMING, 
THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY 
PLEA PROCESS 203–05 (1988); Jo Dixon, The Organizational 
Context of Criminal Sentencing, 100 AM. J. SOC. 1157, 1157–58 
(1995); Rodney L. Engen & Sara Steen, The Power to Punish: 
Discretion and Sentencing Reform in the War on Drugs, 105 
AM. J. SOC. 1357, 1363 (2000); Malcolm D. Holmes, Howard C. 
Daudistel & William A. Taggart, Plea Bargaining Policy and 
State District Court Caseloads: An Interrupted Time Series 
Analysis, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 139 (1992). 
19 Celesta A. Albonetti, Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, 
and Uncertainty: Toward a Theory of Discretionary Decision-
Making in Felony Cases, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 623 (1986). 
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are rewarded for pleading guilty because trials are an 
inherently uncertain and stressful event for court 
actors—decisions to pursue trials require prosecutors, 
defenders, and judiciary to manage unreliable or 
disreputable witnesses, questionable testimony, and/or 
the use of less-direct evidence which may or may not 
influence a decision of guilt. Plea deals are therefore 
encouraged to reduce the uncertainty of decisions and 
outcomes. A final theory, and one that is highlighted by 
the sentencing guidelines, argues that the decision to 
plead guilty as opposed to taking a case to trial is 
associated with differences in perceived 
blameworthiness.20 The federal guidelines state that 
defendants should receive guideline-based sentencing 
discounts or departures for “acceptance of responsibility” 
and “substantial assistance to law enforcement.”21 Thus, 
defendants who plead guilty, and therefore accept 
responsibility, are rewarded with lighter sentences than 
those who may not be perceived as accepting 
responsibility and showing remorse for behavior. 
In contrast to arguments that plea bargaining is a 
coercive practice, there is some scholarly discussion to 
suggest that a defendant’s decision to accept a plea of 
guilty is arrived at through a rational decision-making 
process that is not dissimilar to the process by which 
court actors decide to employ plea bargaining. More 
specifically, advocates of plea bargaining argue that the 
process affords the defendant the opportunity to 
participate in a rational decision-making process 
whereby the costs associated with extending a case are 
weighed against the possibility of reduced sentencing or 
acquittal.22 Research in misdemeanor courts, in 
                                               
20 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2009). 
21 Id.  
22 Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1117, 1136–38 (2008); Candice McCoy, Plea Bargaining as 
Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea-Bargaining Reform, 50 
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particular, has shown that defendants care less about the 
outcome of the case and more about the efficiency 
provided by the plea process, which can offset financial 
costs and time investment associated with extending the 
length of cases.23 However, it might also be the case that 
an efficiency theory may only apply to defendants 
charged with less severe offenses. In other words, 
defendants who are charged with a misdemeanor offense 
that carries less severe sentencing outcomes might be 
more inclined to plead guilty to “get it over with”; 
whereas defendants charged with a felony offense that 
carries more severe sentencing outcomes might be more 
invested in the outcome of the case and, particularly if 
they believe they are innocent. Another argument 
suggests that defendants decide to enter a plea of guilty 
in an effort to decrease the uncertainty of verdicts that 
might be made by a jury or a judge at a later point in 
time. In this regard, theories of uncertainty avoidance 
argue that the plea process provides both defendants and 
court actors with respite from the stress associated with 
trial work.  Finally, defendant decision-making may be 
driven by blameworthiness. The decision to accept a plea 
of guilty, therefore, is made in an effort to accept 
responsibility and express remorse for the offense.  
 
IV. Perceptions of Justice 
 
Scholars often cite decision-making as an 
important contributing factor to overall perceptions of 
fairness and justice. Indeed, the most common criticism 
of plea bargaining is that the process limits the 
defendant’s ability to be involved in the procedures and 
decisions made in their case. This criticism, however, is 
                                               
CRIM. L.Q. 67, 69, 73 (2005); Bibas, supra note 7, at 2496–99, 
2507; Douglas A. Smith, The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 949, 950–51 (1986); Langbein, 
supra note 10, at 8. 
23 FEELEY, supra note 3, at 187–89. 
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juxtaposed by scholars who argue that the plea process 
should be positively associated with perceptions of justice 
because the process requires defendants to make the 
decision about whether or not to accept a plea bargain, 
which is associated with the outcome of their case.24 
Despite the arguments on both sites, a relatively small 
body of research has actually considered the implications 
of plea bargaining on defendant experiences and 
perspectives of justice and fairness. The studies that do 
exist are more than thirty years old and rely on data 
collected in very different court settings than the ones 
defendants encounter today.25  
Classical work on how defendants perceive court 
experiences has focused on theories of distributive justice 
                                               
24 JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE 
DEFENDANT’S PERSPECTIVE 94 (1972). 
25 For example, previous influential work on plea bargaining 
by CASPER, supra note 13, supra note 24, by Tom Tyler, The 
Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of their 
Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW &  SOC’Y REV. 51 (1984), and by 
FEELEY, supra note 3, in the 1970s and 1980s predate 
mandatory sentencing laws and “tough on crime” policies that 
have reshaped courtroom justice and increased the stakes for 
defendants. The effect of these laws can be seen most directly 
in today’s record high jail and prison populations; however, 
“tough on crime” policies have also increased both the number 
of low-level, petty offenders charged in misdemeanor courts 
and increased the amount of time and cost necessary to defend 
criminal cases charged in felony courts, BORUCHOWITZ, supra 
note 2 at 7, 25. In addition, defendants today face more civil 
sanctions as a result of criminal convictions, including the loss 
of legal immigration status, public benefits, housing, driver’s 
license, and employment. BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 2 at 7, 25; 
CASPER, supra note 13; CASPER, supra note 24; FEELEY, supra 
note 3; Tyler, supra note 25; Becky Pettit & Bruce 
Western, Mass Imprisonment and Life Course: Race and Class 
Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151, 153 
(2004); Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral 
Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State 
Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION 10 (1996). 
42
PLEADING GUILTY 
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 459 (2019) 
 
[471] 
which extend early formulations of Adam’s equity theory 
to argue that individuals assess satisfaction with 
outcomes when they are perceived as comparable to the 
outcomes incurred by others.26 Research in a variety of 
contexts, including the courts, shows that distributive 
justice is an influential factor in determining individuals’ 
perception of outcome fairness.27 For example, Casper’s 
research in the 1970s shows that male defendants who 
consider their outcome to be fair are most likely to 
indicate that they perceive their sentence as a “good 
break,” or a reasonable sentence relative to the going rate 
for the offense.28  
In 1975, Thibaut and Walker moved beyond the 
basic assumptions of distributive justice by 
hypothesizing that satisfaction with court outcomes is 
independently influenced by perceptions of procedural 
justice—judgments about the fairness of the resolution 
process.29 Theories of procedural justice argue that 
evaluations of justice and outcome fairness are 
influenced by the opportunities that defendants have to 
be involved in the decisions made in their case (decision 
control) and the opportunities that defendants have to 
participate in the proceedings of their case by expressing 
                                               
26 J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES 
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267, 272–76 (Leonard 
Berkowetz ed., 1965). 
27 E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 10–12 (1988); Adams, supra note 26, at 
272–76; Dean B. McFarlin & Paul D. Sweeney, Distributive 
and Procedural Justice as Predictors of Satisfaction with 
Personal and Organizational Outcomes, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
626, 629, 634 (1992);  Robert Folger & Mary Konovsky, Effects 
of Procedural and Distributive Justice on Reactions to Pay 
Raise Decisions, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 115, 115–16 (1989); Jerald 
Greenberg, Organizational Justice: Yesterday, Today, and 
Tomorrow, 16 J. MGMT. 399, 400, 402–04, 406 (1987). 
28 CASPER, supra note 13. 
29 JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). 
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their side of the story and presenting personal 
information and evidence that is relevant to their case 
(process control). One of the most striking discoveries of 
the research completed by Thibaut and Walker was the 
finding that satisfaction and perceived fairness are 
affected by factors other than whether the defendant 
“won” or “lost” their case.30 In this regard, Thibaut and 
Walker’s research was the first to suggest that it is 
possible to enhance defendant’s perceptions of fair 
treatment without focusing explicitly on distributive 
fairness.  
More recently, scholars have extended theories of 
procedural justice to include the behaviors of the actors 
who implement legal processes, and to argue that 
perceptions of fairness are closely tied to legitimacy and 
the likelihood that individuals will obey the law.31 In this 
regard, if defendants perceive court processes and the 
behaviors of court actors, including publicly assigned 
defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges, as fair, they 
will be more likely to view courts as legitimate and 
cooperate with their efforts and decisions. However, if 
defendants perceive the processes and the behaviors of 
court actors as unfair, they will be less likely to view 
courts as legitimate and subsequently less likely to 
cooperate with their efforts and decisions. Research on 
policing practice indicates that when police treat citizens 
                                               
30 Id; John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 
66 CAL. L. REV. 541, 548–49 (1978).  
31 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN HUO. TRUST IN THE LAW: 
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND 
COURTS (2002); Tom R. Tyler, Process Based Regulation: 
Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 
30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 297, 306–07, 309–10 (2003); Jason 
Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and 
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 513, 514, 523 (2003); Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. 
Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, 
Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 
CRIMINOLOGY 253, 263, 270 (2004). 
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fairly and with respect, police legitimacy is enhanced, as 
well as citizen cooperation and support of police officers, 
although limited research has focused specific attention 
to the association between perceptions of criminal court 
processes and actors, and legitimacy and law-abiding 
behavior.32  
 
V. Race and Class 
 
Particularly important to understanding how 
individuals accused of a crime make decisions to accept a 
plea of guilty and their perceptions of justice is the impact 
of race and class. When this research was conducted, 
black defendants accounted for 37 percent of adults aged 
40 or older and 55 percent of juveniles charged with a 
criminal offense in urban courts.33 Today, black 
individuals account for approximately 13 percent of the 
U.S. population,34 yet black men represent 
approximately 40 percent of incarcerated individuals.35 
In addition, at least 40 percent of individuals imprisoned 
cannot read, and over two-thirds are either unemployed 
                                               
32 Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Unfair by Design: The 
War on Drugs, Race, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice 
System, 73 SOC. RES. 445, 467–68 (2006); Sunshine & Tyler, 
supra note 31, at 514, 520; Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 31, at 
275–77; Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and 
Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in 
Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 239–40, 242 
(2008); Tom R. Tyler, Jonathan D. Casper & Bonnie Fisher, 
Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role 
of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 629, 645–46 (1989). 
33 REAVES, supra note 4, at 5. 
34 QuickFacts: Population Estimates, July 1, 2018, (V2018), 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/ 
fact/table/US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/R3VH-SWKQ]. 
35 E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 
2016, at 7 (2018). 
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or underemployed when arrested.36  Decades of research 
on racial disparity and criminal justice, in conjunction 
with the most recent deadly encounters between law 
enforcement and black citizens, highlights the need to be 
cognizant of the impact of relentless policing efforts and 
harsh sentencing practices on the daily experiences of 
poor, black individuals who are accused of a crime.  
Crime policies in the 1980s and 1990s increased 
the presence of the criminal justice system in the lives of 
poor communities; the war on drugs, in particular, 
increased the frequency and type of police-citizen 
encounters in urban city areas. As a result, the criminal 
justice system has not only become a primary source of 
civic education for the poor but has led to distrust and 
disillusionment with the “system.” Previous research 
shows that this distrust has typically been directed 
towards law enforcement and is shaped by race.37 Zero-
tolerance policing and the use of aggressive police tactics 
                                               
36 BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 
(2006); MICHAEL H. TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING 
AMERICAN DILEMMA 12–13 (2011); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL 
JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); MICHAEL H. TONRY, 
MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 
(1995); Kevin L. Jackson, Differences in the Background and 
Criminal Justice Characteristics of Young Black, White and 
Hispanic Male Federal Prison Inmates, 27 J. BLACK STUD. 494, 
497 (1997); David C. Leven, Curing America’s Addiction to 
Prisons, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 641, 646 (1993). 
37 Bobo & Thompson, supra note 32, at 467; Jon Hurwitz & 
Mark Peffley, Explaining the Great Racial Divide: Perceptions 
of Fairness in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 67 J. POL. 762, 
767 (2005); Ronald  Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Perceptions of 
Racial Profiling: Race, Class, and Personal Experience, 40 
CRIMINOLOGY 435, 443 (2002); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. 
Tuch, Race, Class, and Perceptions of Discrimination by the 
Police, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 494, 502 (1999); Richard 
Scaglion & Richard G. Condon, Determinants of Attitudes 
Toward City Police, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 485, 489 (1980). 
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have prompted accusations of racial profiling and 
contributed to tense relationships between law 
enforcement and residents of high-crime areas.  
Yet, the extent to which class and race are 
associated with negative attitudes towards criminal 
courts remains the subject of debate. It seems probable 
that negative perceptions of law enforcement would 
extend to the entire legal system. Bobo and Johnson, for 
example, argue that black individuals “are far more 
likely to believe” that the administration of criminal 
justice is “riddled with systematic bias” based on negative 
encounters with law enforcement.38 Hurwitz and Peffley 
argue that because legal perspectives are based 
predominantly on personal experiences with criminal 
justice actors in communities, negative interactions with 
law enforcement heavily contribute to an overall 
perception that the justice system as inherently unfair.39 
Moreover, Lind and Tyler assert that people who believe 
the justice system to be unfair tend to evaluate the entire 
political system as less legitimate—for much of the poor, 
the justice system is as close as individuals come to the 
government.40 Thus, low levels of support for police may 
bridge across institutions, undermine support for the 
broader system, and influence decision-making and 
perceptions of justice related to court processes and plea 
bargains.  
 
VI. The Current Study 
 
This study focuses attention to the intersection 
between public defense and plea bargaining, and the 
decision-making process of indigent defendants and 
                                               
38 Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste For 
Punishment: Black and White Americans’ Views on the Death 
Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DU BOIS REV. 151, 156–157 
(2004). 
39 Hurwitz & Peffley, supra note 37, at 767.   
40 LIND & TYLER, supra note 27, at 70. 
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perceptions of justice. The overarching goal of this 
research is to raise awareness of and increase knowledge 
on the experiences of the individuals who are accused of 
a crime and, in particular, those who are financially 
unable to retain private counsel and therefore are reliant 
on the legal services of a public defender. In doing so, we 
rely on the theories of decision-making and perceptions 
of justice presented in the previous pages to guide our 
analysis but shift the prior application of these theories 
away from court actors and police to indigent defendants 
and the courts. The key research questions that guide 
this study include: 
 
1. Why do defendants plead guilty? 
2. How does the decision to accept a plea influence 
perspectives of case outcomes? 
3. Do defendants perceive the plea process as fair 
and why or why not? 
 
VII. Data and Methods 
 
The findings of this study are guided by 
qualitative and administrative data collected between 
the years of 2008 and 2011 in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, located in Hennepin County, Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. When this study was completed, Hennepin 
County was the largest county in Minnesota with a 
population of slightly over 1 million, or approximately 25 
percent of the state population.41 Hennepin County is one 
of ten judicial districts in Minnesota, and one of two 
judicial districts with a full-time public defender office. 
Over forty percent of the total number of adult criminal 
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cases in the state were processed through the Hennepin 
County court. Black individuals comprised fifty percent 
of defendants who received the services of a public 
defender in Hennepin County; twenty-four percent were 
female (see Table 1 for a description of defendants). 
 Administrative data was obtained for all cases 
that were referred to Hennepin County between the 
years of 2008–2011. Qualitative data was collected in 
2010 and 2011 and relies on observational data collected 
in over 250 misdemeanor and felony cases across six 
public defenders and semi-structured interviews with 40 
defendants. Observations included defender-client 
interviews and meetings held in jail, custody, court, and 
defender offices, and defender-prosecutor negotiations 
held in judges’ chambers and in and outside of the 
courtroom. Cases observed for this study were not 
randomly selected, but rather, were dependent on the 
public defender’s calendar and the defendants that were 
assigned to the defender on a particular day. All 
defendants included in this research consented to the 
study during their first appearance with the public 
defender. Cases were tracked as they progressed through 
disposition, unless the case was dismissed, the defendant 
was rearrested, the case was transferred to a specialty 
court, or the defendant failed to appear.    
 Informal defendant interviews were conducted 
throughout the case, and forty defendants were formally 
interviewed following case disposition. Informal 
interviews with defendants typically occurred in court 
hallways while the defendants were waiting for their 
cases to be called and were used to collect data on what 
they understood to be happening in their cases, desired 
outcomes, perceptions of interactions with their public 
defender and the plea bargains that had been offered, as 
well as considerations for accepting or rejecting a plea 
offer. Formal interviews occurred in a designated, 
confidential space, including libraries, parks, and 
correctional institutions. Formal interviews lasted 
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anywhere from 30 minutes to 3 hours and included 
questions about defendants’ understanding of the 
procedures and outcome of their cases, the fairness of 
their outcomes, decisions made in their cases, 
experiences with their public defenders, and whether 
they felt as if race/ethnicity impacted their court 
experiences. Interviews also included questions taken 
from prior research with defendants by Tyler and Casper 
to collect data on procedural justice, including 
perceptions of the processes and outcomes of their cases, 
their ability to participate in the decisions made in their 
case, and whether they felt as if they had a voice and were 
respected.42   
 
A. Analytic Strategy 
 
Detailed notes were taken and recorded 
throughout this research. Formal interviews were audio 
recorded and transcribed for data analysis. To answer the 
research questions of this study, analysis of formal 
interviews on defendant decision-making included 
responses to the following questions: Why did you accept 
a plea of guilty instead of pursue a trial?; What factors 
did you consider when you were making the decision to 
plead guilty?; Did you originally intend or want to plead 
guilty?; and, Did you understand the plea-bargaining 
process and the outcome? All responses are coded into one 
of three themes, following the theoretical literature on 
plea bargain decision-making—Efficiency, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, and Blameworthiness. Analysis of perceptions 
of justice included responses to the following questions: 
Do you think that the outcome of your case was fair?; Do 
you think that the procedures were fair?; Were you 
satisfied with the use of plea bargaining in your case?; 
Did you feel as if you had the ability to participate in the 
decisions made in your case?; Did you feel that you had a 
                                               
42 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); CASPER, 
supra note 24, at 90–91.  
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voice, and that you were listened to?; Do you feel that you 
were respected?; Did you feel as if your lawyer wanted 
you to plead guilty?; Did you feel that your lawyer was on 
your side?; and, Did you feel that your lawyer was fair to 
you? 
 In the following pages, we first present findings 
on why defendants decide to plead guilty and then 
consider perceptions of the plea outcome and process. 
Because data was collected across varying levels of case 
severity, we consider how perceptions differ among 
individuals charged with felonies and less serious 
charges. Past research has not considered how both 
defendant characteristics and case severity interact with 
and influence differences in court experiences; however, 
it is possible that defendants who face more severe 
sanctions, including imprisonment, loss of employment, 
and loss of housing, may be more concerned with the 
outcomes of their case and inclined to more actively 
participate in the procedures and decisions made in their 
case. In contrast, defendants who are confronted with 
less severe sanctions may articulate less concern with the 
procedures and outcomes of their case and, therefore, not 
be as inclined to participate in their case. It is also likely 
that defendants who are solely charged with 
misdemeanors have fewer opportunities to participate in 
the procedures of their case. Because misdemeanor 
courtrooms often have many cases to consider in a 
relatively short amount of time, attorney-client 




The characteristics of all Hennepin County 
defendants, defendants who received legal services 
through the public defender’s office, and the defendants 
interviewed for this study are reported in Table 1. 
Similar to courts across the U.S., Hennepin County 
defendants are disproportionately poor, young, and male. 
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Black defendants represent thirty percent of the total 
population but fifty percent of defendants who received 
legal services through the public defender’s office. Over 
sixty percent of both the total sample and the defendants 
who received legal services through the public defender’s 
office were charged with a misdemeanor offense—an 
offense that carries a sentence of up to a maximum of 
ninety days in jail and/or a $1000 fine. The demographics 
of defendants interviewed for this study are 
representative of those who received legal service 
through the public defender’s office; however, defendants 
charged with a felony are overrepresented compared to 
the number of felony cases represented by public 
defenders (sixty percent and seventeen percent, 
respectively). All defendants who were interviewed for 
this study and who were convicted and sentenced 
accepted an offer to plead guilty. Six defendants 
interviewed had their case dismissed, but five out of the 
six attended several court dates and entertained plea 
offers until their cases were dismissed. 
 
Table 1. Selected Characteristics of Defendants (D’s) in Hennepin 
County, the Public Defender’s Office, and the Interview Sample 








the Interview  
Sample 
Total  59,484    21,848 40 
 n % n % n % 
Gender       
Male 42,382 71 16,494 75 31 77 
Female 15,060 25 5,073 24 9 23 
Missing 2,042 4 281 1 -- -- 
Race       
White 18,204 31 5,180 24 13 33 
Black 21,866 37 11,013 50 24 60 
Hispanic 2,836 5 1,131 5 -- -- 
Other2 16,578 27 4,524 21 3 7 
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< 18 171 <1 20 <1 -- -- 
18-25 18,600 31 7,781 36 14 36 
26-35 17,576 29 6,026 27 9 22 
36-45 11,680 20 4,297 20 9 22 
46-55 8,406 14 3,054 14 8 20 
> 56 3,051 5 670 3 -- -- 
Charge       




6,257 11 2,813 13 2 5 




9,250 15 209 1 -- -- 
Offense       
Homicide 44 <1 31 <1 -- -- 
Assault 4,400 7 2,852 13 3 8 
Domestic 706 1 509 2 4 10 
Sex Offense 481 <1 304 1 2 5 
Weapons 606 1 432 2 0 -- 
Drugs 1,463 2 831 4 4 10 
Property 2,607 4 1,785 9 16 40 
Alcohol 
 
7,979 13 2,552 12 1 2 
Conduct3 
 
15,317 26 8,058 37 3 8 
Traffic 24,797 42 4,222 19 7 17 















11,720 20 -- -- -- -- 
None 25,916 43 -- -- -- -- 
Disposition       
Dismissed5 29,081 49 12,185 56 6 15 
Convicted 15,567 26 6,238 29 14 35 
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1 Data obtained from Hennepin County Research Division; Data 
contains all adult criminal cases filed; Data includes only one 
charge per criminal case. 
2 Includes Native American (3%), Asian (2%), Hawaiian (<1%), and 
defendants whose race is missing. 
3 Includes defendants charged with disorderly conduct, trespassing, 
loitering, solicitation, obstructing justice, etc.  
4 Includes defendants charged with land, housing, boating, animal 
violations, etc.  
5 Includes cases that were dismissed for mental incompetence (<1%) 
and cases that were acquitted (<1%). 
6 A stay of imposition (SOI) or stay of execution occurs when an 
imposition is pronounced but delayed to a further date. If the offender 
complies with the conditions of the court, a felony conviction will be 
reduced to a misdemeanor conviction. If the offender fails to comply 
with the conditions of the court, the court may hold a hearing and 
impose/execute the sentence.  
7 Includes cases with a disposition of stay of adjudication (SOA) or 
continued without prosecution (CWOP). SOAs and CWOPs occur 
when a defendant pleads guilty and the case is continued for 
dismissal. SOAs and CWOPs do not result in a conviction unless the 
defendant violates conditions of the court. SOAs and CWOPs include 
cases that are diverted through probation and/or diversion programs. 
 
A. Deciding to Plead Guilty—Efficiency, 
Avoiding Uncertainty, and Blameworthiness 
 
 Table 2 presents the proportion of defendants who 
pled guilty for reasons associated with efficiency, 
avoiding uncertainty, and blameworthiness. The smallest 
proportion of defendants (11 percent) indicated that they 
pled guilty because they committed the crime and felt 
that they needed to take responsibility for their 
behaviors. The largest proportion (50 percent) of 
defendants indicated that they pled guilty because of the 
efficiency offered by the plea process. The second largest 
group of defendants (38 percent) indicated that they pled 
Stay of 
Imposition6 
2,187 3 978 4 6 15 
Continued7 12,621 21 2,428 11 14 35 
Missing 28 <1 19 <1 -- -- 
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guilty because they did not want to risk taking their case 
to trial and receiving a more severe sentence.  
 






 n % n % n % 
Total 4 11.7 17 50.0 13 38.3 
Gender       
   Male 2 8.0 13 52.0 10 40.0 
   Female 2 22.0 4 44.6 3 33.4 
Race       
   White 2 15.4 6 46.1 5 38.5 
   Black 2 10.5 10 52.6 7 36.9 
   Other -- -- 1 50.0 1 50.0 
Charge       
Misdemeanor 
and Gross 1 9.0 7 63.6 3 27.2 
   Felony 3 13.0 10 43.5 10 43.5 
Priors       
   Yes 2 8.0 13 52.0 10 40.0 
   No 2 22.2 4 44.5 3 33.3 
In Custody       
   Yes -- -- 2 33.3 4 66.7 
   No 4 14.3 15 53.6 9 32.1 
* Results do not include those defendants whose case was dismissed 
(N = 6) 
 
 Black and white defendants, and those with and 
without prior convictions, indicated that they pled guilty 
because of the time and money savings associated with 
accepting a plea deal. Two-thirds of defendants who were 
facing a less severe charge than a felony pled to “get it 
over with,” and half of those charged with a felony made 
the same decision. The finding that individuals charged 
with a felony enter pleas of guilty because of the 
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efficiency offered by the plea process is somewhat 
surprising. Research in the lower courts indicates that 
defendants who are charged with misdemeanors are most 
concerned about how quickly the case can be resolved, 
versus the outcome of the case.43 For individuals who are 
charged with more severe offenses, we often assume that 
there will be an increased concern with the procedures 
and outcome of the case, versus the efficiency of the 
process. Our finding, however, indicates that individuals 
who are charged with a felony are not dissimilar from 
individuals who are charged with less severe offenses 
when making decisions about whether to enter a plea of 
guilty.  
 Over half of the individuals who indicated that 
they accepted a plea of guilty for reasons associated with 
efficiency and uncertainty avoidance were incarcerated 
pretrial. This finding is supported by prior research on 
the impact of pretrial custody which indicates that 
prosecutorial offers to “get out of jail” typically trumps 
defendants’ interest in pursuing a trial because of the 
time required to take a case to trial and the risks 
associated.44 This finding is articulated through the 
following statements made by defendants:  
 
Personally, I would just go with whatever 
they give me so I can hurry up and get out 
of there. I just went on and told them yep, 
yep, whatever, anything as long as it’s 
going to get me out of here. (male, black, 
felony) 
 
                                               
43 FEELEY, supra note 3.  
44 Albert A. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 61–62 (1968); Bowers, supra 
note 22, at 1133; FEELEY, supra note 3; Gerard E. Lynch, Our 
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117, 2146 (1998).  
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Nah, I ain’t taking nothing to trial. Plead, 
give them what they want, get out. A lot of 
people can’t take it to trial because they got 
family shit at home. (male, black, felony) 
 
While the majority of defendants articulated support for 
an efficiency perspective of decision-making, how they 
arrived at their final decision was nuanced and 
contextualized by considerations of guilt and risk. 
Defendants indicated that they decided not to take their 
case to trial because it would require too much time and 
money. However, this decision was often juxtaposed by 
defendants stating that they were guilty—so why fight 
it?—or that they did not want to risk the outcome of a 
trial—so why spend the time on taking it to trial?  
 
It’s too emotionally and physically 
draining for somebody to have to go 
through that [trial].  And then, you know, 
that means I have to take more time off 
work, more time finding someone to watch 
my kids, more time to do this.  It’s just not 
worth it overall.  I’ll take my responsibility. 
I'm in trouble, I’ll take my year of 
probation, I’ll do my fines and then it’s 
done. It just seemed like an easier way to 
go. Less fines. No jail time . . . I know I did 
something wrong. (female, white, 
misdemeanor) 
 
They was offering me six years, you know 
what I’m saying, so I fought it.  I fought it 
for like four and a half months.  I’m sitting 
down in the county [jail] just fighting it.  
Like no way, I’m not taking this.  I didn’t 
do nothing and I shouldn’t even be here.  
But, like the deals are getting worse and 
worse and worse.  They first offered me 48 
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months and then they went to 52 and then 
they went to 57, so they kept climbing the 
deals…No I didn’t take it to trial because 
they said if I don’t take it to trial they’ll just 
give me four more months.  Just do four 
more months because I already did four 
more months.  So they made it seem so 
sweet to me, but it hurt me in the long run, 
you know, because I’ve never been in jail 
before.  So I’m panicking, I’m in jail for four 
months and I’m like oh my goodness seems 
like I’ve been gone for like two years just 
sitting in a little cage, cell by yourself is 
crazy.  I’ve never been in that position so I’m 
like freaking out.  I wanted to take it to 
trial, but I just couldn’t handle the jail, you 
know, and what if I did lose because, you 
know, I don’t know.  I would never want to 
use it as an excuse, but you know I just felt 
that I might have lost.  If I would have lost, 
I would have been sitting in prison for six 
years. (male, black, felony) 
 
B. Deciding to Plead Guilty—
Misunderstanding and Fear 
 
 While theories of efficiency, uncertainty 
avoidance, and blameworthiness are associated with 
defendants’ decisions to plead guilty, the most commonly 
articulated factors that mediated decisions to accept a 
plea of guilty were misunderstanding and fear. The 
observational and interview findings of this study 
suggest that defendants do not understand the charges 
to which they are pleading guilty, the sentence, and the 
consequences of entering a plea of guilty. Stemming from 
misunderstandings about the plea process and the legal 
language associated with plea bargains, defendants 
entered pleas of guilty to exit a situation that they do not 
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understand and have little control over.  
 
I believe like at court when they brought it 
up it was kind of like a deal saying that I 
would have been on probation for two 
years—felony probation. And you know, I 
do kind of have a little experience with 
court . . . but not really as an adult.  So I 
didn’t really know what was going to 
happen. And I . . . you know I really didn’t 
want to go through that whole process so I 
took the first thing that was handed to me.  
And that’s kind of what got me in this 
situation . . . well not exactly this situation 
but got me on probation. But you know I 
really don’t, you know. And . . . ah . . . yeah, 
I just feel like the decisions that was made 
was a part of me being tired of dealing with 
things, and not understanding what was 
going on. . . . I just felt like I didn’t want to 
deal with it. (male, black, felony) 
 
Particularly when it’s your first time in 
there, it’s scary.  Everything is moving 
quickly.  A lot of people they talk like they 
get very frustrated by that and they get 
more scared because they have no idea 
what’s going on, and then you’re asked to 
make pretty quick decisions. And most 
people like me myself personally I would 
just go with whatever they give me so I can 
hurry up and get out of there. Sometimes I 
just agree just to get out of jail or to get out 
of the court room.  Like the day we were 
there for the pre-trial [conference] I was 
already ready to take whatever they were 
going to give me. (male, black, 
misdemeanor) 
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I don’t even want to risk it.  I’m not too—I 
don’t know too much about the system or 
the law or too much about that.  I never 
really had to deal with it like that.  So 
taking them to court, I think it would be a 
waste of time because I don’t get it. I’ll just 
move on. (male, black, misdemeanor)  
 
Defendants often considered not accepting a plea of guilty 
and taking their case to trial, but out of fear, ended up 
accepting a plea of guilty. This finding is particularly 
relevant as scholarly interest in wrongful convictions in 
the U.S. has garnered increasing attention over the past 
decade due in large part to a growing public awareness of 
wrongful convictions, and the increasing number of 
individuals whose sentences are vacated because they 
were convicted of a crime that they did not commit. Since 
1989, more than 2,100 people have had their sentences 
vacated.45 In 2017 alone, more than 130 individuals were 
identified as convicted for a crime that they did not 
commit.46 Although estimates of the rate of wrongful 
convictions vary, and typically focus on capital charges 
and cases in which charges have been vacated, 
observational and interview data collected in this study 
suggest that defendants who are charged with 
misdemeanor and felony offenses and whom claim 
innocence do plead guilty.  
 
I took a plea agreement without even 
knowing what I was going to get.  Like not 
                                               
45 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, UNIV. OF CAL. IRVINE, 
EXONERATIONS IN 2017, at 3(2017).  
46 Id. This number does not include approximately 96 
individuals whose drug-related convictions were found to be 
the result of systematic framing on the part of police officers in 
Baltimore and Chicago. Id. at 1. At the time of publication, 176 
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even a full understanding, I just, I don’t 
know.  Like my public defender wanted me 
to keep the plea as not guilty.  Like he told 
me that a couple times and like I just 
wanted out.  I’d rather, I guess I’d rather 
have my plea as not guilty if I could have 
stayed out and gone to trial.  If I knew I was 
going to be out then I pled not guilty 
because I don’t think they could have 
proved beyond reasonable doubt that I did 
this because there was no evidence—there 
is absolutely nothing . . . . Obviously, I 
think I would win, but the whole “what if I 
don’t.”  What if I don’t, then I’m dead. 
Because I’ve never been through the courts 
before.  I’ve never been to the jail before, so 
I didn’t know anything.  I had no idea what 
was going on, like I’m just sitting there not 
knowing if I’m going to get out and not 
knowing if I needed to see the judge or what 
was going on. And so, then that’s when I’m 
just like well I just want to take the plea.  I 
just want to get out of here.  I guess there 
was another plea and I didn’t understand 
the other one. I guess like I know that’s not 
why, like you’re not supposed to take a plea 
to get out of jail.  Like you can’t do it I guess, 
but I would say that’s pretty much what I 
did just because I wanted it done with—so 
I could move on. I guess I just kind of 
misunderstood. (male, white, 
misdemeanor) 
 
I didn’t want to take the plea.  I said, “No.  
I don’t want to.”  But now when it gets all 
the way to this point and I got out and I got 
all my jobs back.  Fuck it.  Now I got out I 
might as well take it and get it over with. 
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When I was in jail I said, let’s do something 
right now.  But no.  Nobody wanted to do 
nothing.  But they gave me this opportunity 
to get out and . . . I don’t want to take it to 
trial now. (female, black, felony) 
 
C. Perceptions of the Plea Outcome as Fair 
 
Given the findings associated with defendant 
decisions to accept a plea of guilty, it is compelling to 
consider whether defendants perceive the outcomes and 
procedures of their case as fair. Table 3 provides 
information on the association between defendant 
characteristics and the indicators of procedural fairness, 
outcome fairness, and case participation. Over 60 percent 
of defendants interviewed for this study expressed 
positive perceptions of the procedures and outcomes of 
their case while 72 percent expressed negative 
perceptions of their ability to participate in their case. 
Defendants charged with both felony and lesser charges 
articulated positive perceptions of the plea process (62 
percent) and outcome (62 percent and 81 percent, 
respectively). Those individuals whose cases were 
dismissed overwhelmingly agreed that the court process 
and outcome was fair (100 percent); only one defendant 
whose case was dismissed felt that he did not have input 
in the process. Defendants who received a disposition 
other than dismissal were still most likely to express 
positive perceptions of the plea process (between 50 and 
64 percent), but overwhelmingly expressed concern about 
their ability to participate in the procedures and 
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Table 3. Defendant Perceptions of Plea Bargaining 
 Process is Fair Outcome is Fair Participation 
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Table 4. Defendant Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, by Process, 
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The two factors that were most strongly 
associated with defendant perceptions of outcome 
fairness was the belief that the outcome received was a 
“good break” or that the outcome was “deserved.” This 
result supports our finding that defendants weigh 
considerations of blameworthiness and uncertainty 
avoidance when deciding to accept a plea of guilty. It is 
also supported by theories of distributive justice and 
prior research on outcome satisfaction. For example, 
Casper found that the majority of male defendants 
describe their sentence as fair, and that perceptions of 
outcome fairness was based on the belief that the 
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sentence receives was less severe than was anticipated—
or at least the “going rate”—and appropriate to the 
crime.47 Defendants interviewed for this study 
articulated similar perceptions:  
 
Yeah, I’m happy with the outcome. I was 
really happy. I was hoping for what I was 
offered, so I pretty much got what I was 
expecting. (female, white, felony) 
 
I thought that that they were going to put 
me on some type of probation for a certain 
amount of time where I would have to keep 
coming back to my probation officer. A lot 
of other things like that, you know, for like 
six months or something, and I won’t be 
able to get my driver’s license until I’m 21 
or something, that’s what I thought was 
going to happen. You know, so it was much 
of a relief when they said—when she said 
she might be able to switch it over to a 
disorderly conduct. Since I had already 
been in jail for two days and the police 
officer maced me, I have had enough 
punishment I guess. So I was really 
relieved when that happened. I’m glad I 
didn’t have to pay no ticket. That would 
have been even worse. . . . At the end of the 
day I’m happy with my outcome, yeah. 
(male, black, misdemeanor) 
 
 Defendants—both those who were interviewed 
and those whose cases were observed—who openly 
discussed their guilt perceived the plea process as a 
means to obtain an outcome that they felt they deserved. 
In this sense, defendants who indicated satisfaction with 
                                               
47 Casper, supra note 13.  
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their outcome adopted a just deserts approach to their 
outcome.48 As one defendant put it, “you do the crime, you 
do the time.” Another defendant charged with three 
felony counts of theft stated that he was “happy” with his 
court experience: 
 
Because of the outcomes that I received . . . 
I face consequences for what I did and if I 
wouldn’t have faced anything, if they had 
just said, “Okay you can go on with your 
business. Don’t ever do that again,” I never 
would have learned from my mistakes. So I 
believe that justice was served in my case. I 
deserved my consequences. I have to take 
part in what I did, pay for what I did. 
(male, white, felony) 
 
 Particularly in DWI and property cases where 
evidence is easily obtained through breathalyzers, blood 
tests, video surveillance, and fingerprinting, the question 
that loomed over defendants was not whether they would 
take their case to trial to dispute guilt, but what plea offer 
they would receive from the prosecutor.  One defendant 
who was ultimately convicted of felony check fraud 
recounts, “Basically the deal that I got—there’s no other 
better way that you could have ever put it, you know 
what I mean? I didn’t have to go to jail and got the same 
probation officer. To be honest with you, I probably 
should have gotten a little bit worse punishment than I 
did considering the fact of what I did.” 
 
 
                                               
48 See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993); 
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS 
AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS (1987); 
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF 
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D. Perceptions of the Plea Process as Fair 
 
 Over 90 percent of the defendants who were 
interviewed for this study and who perceived their 
outcome as fair also perceived the court process leading 
to their outcome as fair. A defining measure of procedural 
fairness in this study was whether defendants felt that 
they were treated the same as other defendants, and 
whether they felt fairly treated by the public defender—
conclusions arrived at by observing other cases and 
talking to other indigent defendants. In most cases, the 
considerable amount of waiting time required for a 
defendant’s case to be called allows plenty of 
opportunities to talk and mingle with other indigent 
defendants in hallways, elevators, and smoking areas. 
These interactions offer defendants a way to “blow off 
steam” and “kill time,” but it also provides them with 
information about others’ experiences, which they use to 
assess their own situation. As one defendant stated after 
stepping out of court, “They treat everyone the same, so 
yeah, I would consider it fair, or fair enough.” 
 For this same reason, however, some defendants 
perceive their treatment as unfair. In these cases, 
defendants articulated concern that their case was being 
handled the same as all other cases and not given 
individual consideration. Defendants expressed concern 
that they never had a conversation with their public 
defender before pleading guilty and did not understand 
the plea process that resulted in their outcome. One 
defendant who was charged with a felony count of 
property theft indicated that he was satisfied with his 
outcome but dissatisfied with the process:  
 
No, I don’t feel that I was treated fairly 
going through the process, but, I mean, 
what choice did I have. . . . He [the public 
defender] never communicated with me. 
Maybe he did do something, but I don’t 
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know what he did. He never told me 
anything. I was on my own. He said, “here 
is what’s going to happen. This is your case, 
so you go over here, go over there. Now you 
just come back and go see the judge and 
you’re on your way.” You know, and I’m like 
“okay.” But, I mean, yes, I am happy with 
the outcome. (male, black, felony) 
 
 This statement illustrates the frustration that 
many defendants articulated about their public defender, 
and how perception of public defenders’ behaviors can 
influence defendant perceptions of fairness. Legal 
scholars identify different and often competing 
conceptions of the role of criminal defense lawyers; 
however, most agree that zealous advocacy of defendants 
is necessary and justified.49 The American Bar 
Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
states that it is a lawyer’s responsibility to “represent a 
client zealously within the bounds of the law.”50  For 
indigent defendants, perceptions of enthusiastic and 
effective representation influence positive and negative 
judgments of public defenders. Those who perceived their 
public defender as an individual who is willing to fight 
for their case—i.e., put time and effort into the case—
were most likely to talk positively about public defenders 
                                               
49 THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 158; Abbe 
Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life 
and Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1209–10 (2004); Margareth Etienne, 
Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: Making 
Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
2103, 2104–05 (2003); Charles J. Ogletree Jr., An Essay on the 
New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 81, 92 (1995); Charles J. Ogletree Jr., Beyond 
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public 
Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1242 (1993). 
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and feel as if they were fairly treated. As one incarcerated 
black male stated, “I felt like she was great. She did 
everything in her power, everything that she could 
possibly do to give me the lesser charge possible or try to 
get me out of it. She did everything that she could do. So 
I felt she did her job really well.” Another white male 
charged with felony theft stated: 
 
Oh, I liked my public defender, she’s a great 
attorney and I really appreciated her help. 
I feel like she did a better job than other 
public defenders I’ve ever had. It just 
seemed like she had an actual knowledge of 
the case, like she actually paid attention to 
it. Most public defenders don’t even know 
who you are until they look in your file 
when they see you. She seemed like she 
actually, you know, took the time and tried 
to find out the best results and get 
information. So, yeah, I was real 
appreciative. I liked her, she was a good 
person. (white, male, felony) 
 
 Defendants who perceived their public defender 
as an individual who was not willing to fight for their case 
were less likely to speak positively about their experience 
with their legal representation and their court 
experience: 
 
Personally, to me, I want to have my own 
lawyer next time. Pay my own lawyer, 
‘cause I know if I got my own lawyer that 
he’s gonna fight for me. The public defender 
is not gonna fight for you. (black, male, 
felony)  
 
I think it’s just not fair, like the public 
defenders are bullshit. Like you can call a 
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real lawyer and he can get you less time, 
but call a public defender and he can get 
you the most time, you know what I’m 
saying? Like if a public defender is 
supposed to be a lawyer, right? So how 
come they can’t act like the lawyer? It’s like 
bullshit, you know. They’re supposed to try 
their hardest. I bet you if somebody was 
paying them, then they will try to go 
harder, know what I mean? A lot of them 
don’t care. They don’t care because they got 
so many cases. They get paid for so many 
cases, so they pretty much want to get you 
in and get you out of their face. (black, 
male, felony) 
 
 Research shows that the most common complaint 
received by public defenders concerns the lack of time 
and attention they give to defendants.51  Professional 
conduct rules require that public defenders keep clients 
informed of the status of their case and promptly respond 
to client requests for information.52 The reality, however, 
is that public defenders are often unable to comply with 
professional duties because of circumstances that include 
excessive caseloads and a failure to be appointed to a case 
in a timely manner.53  When public defenders have too 
                                               
51 Christopher Campbell et al., Unnoticed, Untapped, and 
Underappreciated: Clients’ Perceptions of Their Public 
Defenders, 33 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 751, 758–66 (2015); ROY B. 
FLEMMING ET AL., THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK 
IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES (1992); cf. THE 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 95 (discussing the 
inability of indigent defense attorneys to comply with their 
professional duties due to, among other things, excessive 
caseloads). 
52 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 1998). 
53 BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 22; THE CONSTITUTION 
PROJECT, supra note 2, at 95. 
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many cases, client contact suffers and sometimes 
becomes virtually non-existent. Defenders become 
unavailable to defendants because they are constantly in 
court, which often forces initial public defender-
defendant meetings to take place in the courtroom.  
 
Yeah, like the only reason that I would not 
have him to be my lawyer again is basically 
because of the miscommunication that we 
had. It’s not something that he did with my 
case wrong or anything. It’s just that I feel 
like if I call, if I call you two or three times 
a week and you don’t return any of my calls 
or give me any type of response, something’s 
wrong with that. Either you’re just ignoring 
me or you don’t really care about what’s 
going on with my case. You just want to get 
it over with. And, you know, he has a lot of 
other clients too, but that’s no reason. With 
Monday through Friday, there’s no reason 
that out of those days that I can’t get a 
response from you from calling you two or 
three times a week. (white, male, felony) 
 
The hardest part is getting a hold of the 
public defender. I was trying to get a hold 
of the public defender, but they never call 
you back or talk with you or anything like 
that. So until your date, your next court 
date—that’s the first time I talked with my 
public defender. And all they do is come out 
and ask for a new court date because they 
haven’t had a chance to look over the case 
at all. (white, male, felony)  
 
He talked with me one time and he told me 
the offer, that’s it. (black, male, felony)  
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I wasn’t treated fairly because being treated 
fairly is when you’re honest with your client 
and you put everything on the table and let 
them know what’s going on. (black, female, 
felony) 
 
 Research by Tom Tyler and colleagues suggests 
that defendants are most likely to report positive 
perceptions of court actors if they understand what 
motivates their behavior and decision-making.54  
Authorities who act unexpectedly are not necessarily 
judged to be untrustworthy if people feel that they 
understand why they behave in the manner in which 
they do. Conversations with the defendants in this study 
confirm this finding. As articulated in the previous 
statements, defendants critique public defenders but also 
provide justification for their behaviors. For example, one 
black male who received a stayed sentence for a series of 
misdemeanor violations indicated that he was 
disappointed in his lawyer’s willingness to fight for a 
better plea negotiation—“He was alright, but he could 
have tugged a little harder to get it down a little more.” 
The defendant followed this statement with the following 
explanation for the defender’s behavior:   
 
He was pressed for time ‘cause he got to be 
here, he got to be there. You can’t get mad 
at them because they are overloaded. You 
know, if you want to keep it real, they are 
all public defenders, pretenders, or 
whatever. They are all overloaded. They get 
                                               
54 TYLER, supra note 42; Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural 
Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of 
Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 129 (1998); Tyler, 
supra note 25, at 70; Tom Tyler & Robert J. Bies, Beyond 
Formal Procedures: The Interpersonal Context of Procedural 
Justice, in APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
SETTINGS 78 (John S. Carroll ed., 1990). 
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more and more every day. You know it’s a 
wonder that all of them ain’t half crazy. It’s 
not good. It’s not good. It’s not good. But, 
that’s basically what it is, you know. It’s 
bad because you—you ain’t have no faith in 
the system, you know, ‘cause you ain’t got 
nobody that’s gonna really fight for you. 
Half of them can’t even negotiate on a plea 
bargain, let alone on a trial. I guess that’s 
probably even how they are taught in 
college now-a-days, just to be a deal-maker. 
(male, black, misdemeanor) 
 
 Another white female who received probation for 
a misdemeanor indicated that she was concerned during 
court because she expected to have more opportunities to 
talk with her attorney, but also indicated that “there are 
so many other cases and horrible things that happen, 
that they can’t worry about [her].” Also, a black male who 
was incarcerated for multiple misdemeanors stated, 
 
Those public defenders, you can’t even talk 
to them.  It’s frustrating.  You know that it’s 
six or seven other people to this one person.  
I mean like how many people can you 
actually juggle by yourself?  I thought 
public defenders were supposed to be there 
to help so why isn’t there more of them? 
(male, black, misdemeanor) 
  
 Previous research indicates that defendants 
express sentiments of distrust for public defenders.55 The 
findings of this research, however, indicate that 
defendants are not necessarily distrusting of public 
defenders, but of the system that public defenders work 
                                               
55 CASPER, supra note 24; Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a 
Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had a Public Defender, 
1 YALE REV. LAW SOC. ACTION 4, 6 (1971).  
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for. Public defenders are perceived by defendants as part 
of a larger system that prescribes their behavior.  
 
I do not really feel like he was on my side.  
I’ll be honest with you.  Not really.  I'm just 
another, you know, pawn on the 
chessboard.  He's just doing his job.  Just 
get ‘em in, get ‘em out, get ‘em in, get ‘em 
out, you know? It’s just a job with the 
prosecutor. (male, black, misdemeanor) 
 
When you’re incarcerated they call them 
“public pretenders.” But, you know, it’s the 
truth because you know the prosecutors and 
the public defenders they eat lunch 
together, they go fishing together, you know 
they just hang out together, they’re friends.  
You know, so while they’re like eating 
ravioli, it’s probably like, “Oh what do you 
want to do with him?  Okay I’ll give you 
him, just let me beat this case right here.” 
You know what I’m saying?  It’s like chess 
and it’s kind of messed up. (male, black, 
felony)  
 
It’s not fair because they work for the city. 
So, he started working with the prosecutors 
and seeing what they want to come up with, 
but he’s not asking the client what’s going 
on. It’s not fair. It was all him, him and the 
prosecutor. The public defender is not fair; 
it’s not justice because they do what they 
want to do. What them and the prosecutor 
want to do. (male, black, felony)  
 
 Statements such as these suggest that defendants 
do not necessarily view the behavior of public defenders 
as representative of the defenders themselves, but rather 
as a reflection of the circumstances of their position in the 
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criminal courts, which relies heavily on the plea process 
to ensure efficient case progress. Defendants did not 
perceive public defenders as apathetic but overextended. 
This account of the plea process parallels criticisms 
among scholars who argue that the criminal process has 
evolved into a system of assembly line justice which is 
most concerned with processing cases as quickly and 
efficiently as possible.56 For these reasons, many 
defendants are not provided with contact information for 
their public defenders and, if they are, are not able to 
reach the public defender or receive a return phone call. 
A defendant who was charged with driving with a 
cancelled license for the fifth time explained this 
experience: 
 
Yeah, you know, it’s just like a process, like 
a processing plant. They just process you, 
like they processing cattle. They say, “Okay 
this is what they gonna do for you: so, so, 
so, so. Now if you don’t do this here, now the 
charge carries: so, so, so, so.  Now I can get 
you this here. Right now, today, I can get 
you so, so, so, and then you go to jail.” You 
                                               
56 BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 2; William Glaberson, Faltering 
Courts, Mired in Delays, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/nyregion/justice-denied-
bronx-court-system-mired-in-delays.html 
[https://perma.cc/H3XX-FLA5]; William Galberson, Courts in 
Slow Motion, Aided by the Defense, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 14, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/15/nyregion/justice-denied-
courts-in-slow-motion-aided-by-defense.html 
[https://perma.cc/8W8T-A5NQ]; Ari Shapiro, Report Calls Out 
Flaws In Public Defender System, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, (Apr. 15, 
2009),https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
103108229 [https://perma.cc/3CQP-EBH6]; Cara Tabachnick, 
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know, it’s just a process. You know, they 
don’t have time to deal with no one 
individual, ‘cause they can’t put too much 
time in ‘cause they got so many. Like I say, 
it’s like, “Come on down, you’re the first 
contestant in The Price is Right!” It’s like 
Monty Hall in Let’s Make a Deal. (male, 
black, misdemeanor) 
 
 As this defendant articulates, the plea process can 
move rapidly. On days in which the court calendar is 
full—such as after the weekend or a holiday—or, in 
courts that see a particularly high volume of cases—such 
as property and drug courts—cases can move so quickly 
that there is not time for the defendant to meet or talk to 
their public defender. In conversations with defendants 
after their first appearance, defendants were often 
unable to state the name of their public defender, or how 
they may be able to reach the defender. As one black male 
defendant charged with 5th degree drug possession 
articulates: 
 
The first time I went through it, I was 
terrified. I didn’t know what was going on. 
I felt like I was from Asia and it’s my third 
day here in America and I didn’t have no 
English classes or whatever, so I’m 
speaking a whole different language. And 
they’re just like talking a foreign language 
and I’m like, “What’s going on? I need to 
talk to my lawyer.”  I’m like, “but look I 
don’t understand, like, you know, hold up.” 
I just felt ignorant, you know what I mean. 
The first time, I’m like “oh my.”  I learned 
everything I know about the court system 
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being inside the jail and not from being in 
court, not from my lawyer, but by sitting 
there listening and watching other cases. 
(male, black, felony). 
 
E. Perceptions of Participation and Self-
Expression 
 
 Despite the finding that most defendants perceive 
the outcomes and procedures of their case as fair, over 70 
percent of defendants did not feel like that they had 
adequately participated in their cases. Table 3 indicates 
that over half of all defendants who reported that the 
process and outcome of their case was fair also indicated 
that they did not have enough input in their case. This 
finding is somewhat surprising. As cited previously, the 
extant literature on perceptions of fairness argue that 
when defendants feel as if they are a part of the 
procedures of their case and have adequate opportunities 
to voice their side of the story, positive attitudes of the 
fairness of the outcome and procedures of their case 
increase.57 Empirical studies that consider the plea 
process, however, provide contradictory accounts of the 
effect of participation in plea bargaining on perceptions 
of fairness. For example, some scholars argue that plea 
bargaining provides more control and a heightened sense 
of efficacy because defendants are actively participating 
in their case by pleading guilty in return for an agreed 
upon sentence.58  In this regard, the process of plea 
bargaining can provide defendants with greater certainty 
over their outcome, leading to more positive evaluations 
                                               
57 LIND & TYLER, supra note 27, at 9; THIBAUT & WALKER, supra 
note 29. 
58 Anne M. Heinz, Procedures Versus Consequences: 
Experimental Evidence of Preferences for Procedural and 
Distributive Justice, in COURTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
EMERGING JUSTICE (Susette M. Talarico, ed., 1985). 
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of their process. Casper argues that in cases when 
defendants receive an outcome that is not expected, they 
are more likely to articulate limited participation in their 
case and perceive the process as less fair.59 The findings 
of our research also indicate that defendants who were 
caught off-guard by the decisions of the court were more 
likely to express negative attitudes. One defendant 
charged with 2nd degree assault describes her experience 
of receiving a more severe sentence than she anticipated:  
 
No, we didn’t talk a lot. I left him [public 
defender] a few messages, spoke to him on 
the phone and asked him, you know 
different questions about where I was 
going. He said jail time was out of the 
picture. I knew for a fact that jail time 
wasn’t going to happen. I just knew that for 
a fact that it was no jail time. And then on 
the last day it’s jail time…it wasn’t an 
honest way to come and tell me I was doing 
jail time, to find out on the very last day 
when I go to court that I’m going to get 
sentenced to jail, and never heard it. Before 
any conversation that we had, any 
paperwork that I signed, he never said 
anything. So then I come to court and 
expect probation, monetary probation, 
strict probation, or whatever and then have 
to get locked up. I thought that was very 
unfair because that was the first time I 
heard of it before going into court. I just 
wished he would have talked to me more 
and prepared me a little bit more. When I 
                                               
59 CASPER, supra note 24. 
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expected no jail time and then when I got 
jail time it was like, “oh well, you got jail 
time.” It was like “case closed” for him. Like 
I know he had to know ahead of time before 
five minutes before court. So, oh well, I just 
got to live with it and do my time I guess. I 
would have felt good if I would have had a 
chance to speak more and explain myself. 
Then I would have been prepared for this, 
but like I said, it all hit me like five minutes 
before we went to court, so I wasn’t really 
expecting that. And the judge, the judge 
just agreed to everything that was going on 
and did not take time to listen to my side. 
So, I guess I get the shit end of the stick. 
(female, white, felony) 
 
 In more serious felony cases, such as this one, 
defendants are less likely to be certain of the outcome of 
their plea agreement when they sign it. Unlike 
misdemeanor cases, in which most cases are settled on 
the first or second day in court, felony cases can be 
extended for over a year (as in this case), and often 
involve pre-plea agreements. In cases in which pre-pleas 
are signed, the defendants admit their guilt and consent 
to an interview and evaluation by probation that 
presumably guides the decision of the judge. In most 
cases, public defenders promote pre-plea evaluations as 
an opportunity to decrease defendant sentences because 
they offer the judge and other court members a more 
thorough understanding of the defendant’s history and 
the situation surrounding the case. However, defendants 
often become frustrated after reading these reports 
because they do not feel as if the probation officer 
adequately represents them—most articulated concern 
that the report contained negative information that was 
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not reported by the defendant, such as drug and alcohol 
use.  
 Differences in procedures between felony and 
misdemeanor cases may understandably influence the 
experience of defendants. Table 5 reports defendant 
perceptions of procedures, outcomes, and case 
participation by case severity. These results indicate that 
the most prevalent difference between individuals 
charged with felonies and less severe charges is the 
association that defendants draw between having a voice 
and fair procedures and outcomes. Individuals who are 
charged with felonies, compared to those who are charged 
with less severe offenses, are less likely to indicate that 
they adequately participated in their case (16 percent 
compared to 43 percent) and less likely to associate their 
participation with procedural and outcome fairness. Only 
23 percent of felony defendants agreed that they 
participated in procedures that they experienced as fair 
(compared to 70 percent of misdemeanor/gross 
misdemeanor defendants); 26 percent agreed that they 
had participated in outcomes they perceived as fair 
(compared to 53 percent of misdemeanor/gross 
misdemeanor defendants). Prior examinations of the 
relationship between case severity and court experiences 
suggests that case severity can influence defendants’ 
interest in their case, particularly when the outcomes are 
more severe.60 This research provides support for such 
claims. Defendants in this study who were charged with 
lower-level offenses were more likely to express apathy 
towards the procedures and outcome of their case. For 
example, when asked whether defendants would prefer 
more opportunities to be involved in their case, one 
Hispanic male charged with a misdemeanor count of 
contempt of court responded that the courts can “do what 
they want.” When we subsequently asked if he felt that 
he was treated with respect, he indicated that he “has 
never really thought about it.” Statements such as these 
                                               
60 Heinz, supra note 58. 
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by defendants support observed differences in 
misdemeanor and felony courts. Defendants in 
misdemeanor courts more frequently “blow-off” court 
dates. They plead guilty without talking with their public 
defender about options other than the original plea 
offered by the state. Defendants charged with 
misdemeanors are also more likely to arrive to court 
alone without family or friends, whereas in felony 
courtrooms, family members, friends, and caseworkers 
provide a regular show of support, concern, and input 
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Table 5. Defendant Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, by 
Process, Outcome, Satisfaction, and Charge Level 
  Process is Fair 
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 Research indicates that the majority of 
individuals charged with a crime plead guilty. This study 
focuses on why defendants decide to plead guilty versus 
take their case to trial and their perceptions of the plea 
process and outcomes. Our findings suggest that 
defendants decide to plead guilty, regardless of 
innocence, because the process provides the quickest 
pathway out of court and with little risk. The decision to 
enter a plea of guilty is also influenced by confusion over 
court processes and outcomes, and fear of what may 
happen if the defendant does not accept a plea deal. 
While outcomes associated with plea bargaining are 
considered by defendants to be by and large fair—
primarily because the outcome was expected and 
perceived as comparable to the outcomes that others 
receive—defendants do not always perceive the plea 
process as fair. Dissatisfaction with the legal 
representation and perceived lack of control and input in 
the decisions of their case are key factors that influence 
perceptions of procedural fairness and justice.   
 Scholars and legal practitioners often argue that 
defendants’ decisions to plead guilty reflects their guilt 
and a concern for taking responsibility for their 
behaviors. The courts—particularly federal courts—have 
supported the position that defendants should receive 
leniency in exchange for accepting blame for their 
actions.61 However, while defendant guilt may play a 
mediating effect in defendant decision-making, the 
findings of this research indicate that guilt has little 
direct effect on the decision to plead guilty. Rather, the 
efficiency that the plea process provides is a primary 
influence on defendant decision-making.  Many scholars 
argue that as the number of individuals who intersect 
with the courts increases, plea bargaining provides a 
                                               
61 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2009). 
83
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2 
 
[512] 
quick, inexpensive way to handle growing dockets.62 The 
findings of this research suggest that the plea bargaining 
process is not only preferred by court actors, but also by 
the defendants, who are also influenced by a desire to 
“just get it over with.”   
 In addition to the time and money saved by 
pleading guilty, defendants indicated that they preferred 
the certainty of plea deals. Research shows that 
defendants who decide to take their case to trial and are 
found guilty frequently receive more severe sentences 
than they would if they had pled guilty. Plea-trial 
disparity research shows that some defendants receive a 
sentence at trial that is up to ten times more severe than 
defendants with similar charges and backgrounds who 
decide to plead guilty.63 The results of this study echo 
these findings, with defendants articulating concern for 
the risk associated with taking their case to trial. Many 
defendants felt as if they were receiving a “break” or a 
                                               
62 See sources cited supra note 18. 
63 See Brian D. Johnson et al., The Social Context of Guidelines 
Circumvention: The Case of Federal District Courts, 46 
CRIMINOLOGY 737 (2008); Nancy J. King et al., When Process 
Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea, 
Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 959 (2005); McCoy, supra note 22; Darrell 
Steffensmeier & Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and Judges’ 
Sentencing Decisions:  Hispanic-Black-White Comparisons, 39 
CRIMINOLOGY 145 (2001); Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen 
Demuth, Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal 
Courts: Who is Punished More Harshly?, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 705 
(2000); Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging 
Judicial Discretion: Legal Factors and Racial Discrimination 
in Sentencing, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 733 (2001); Celesta A. 
Albonetti, An Integration of Theories to Explain Judicial 
Discretion, 38 SOC. PROBS. 247 (1991); Gary D. LaFree, 
Adversarial and Nonadversarial Justice: A Comparison of 
Guilty Pleas and Trials, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1985); Ruth D. 
Peterson & John Hagan, Changing Conceptions of Race: 
Towards an Account of Anomalous Findings of Sentencing 
Research, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 56 (1984). 
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“good deal” and were not willing to take the chance that 
they may be acquitted or receive a more lenient sentence 
from a judge or jury at trial.  
 An important finding of this research is the 
influence that misunderstanding has on the decision-
making process of defendants. The findings of this study 
illustrate that defendants arrive at the decision to plead 
guilty through a series of justifications that are 
influenced by the strain of making a quick decision and a 
lack of understanding about plea bargaining, court 
procedures, and the implications of sentencing outcomes. 
Although defendants’ decisions to plead guilty may be 
adequately described by an efficiency or uncertainty 
avoidance perspective, the final decision to accept a plea 
is influenced by a combination of factors that include 
guilt, time and financial concerns, and fear. These 
considerations are mediated by a lack of understanding 
of the legal procedures and language associated with the 
court system. 
 Notably, this study is the first to examine plea 
bargain decision-making through interviews with 
defendants. In doing so, the findings advance our 
understanding of how defendants arrive at the decision 
to plead guilty and contribute to knowledge about 
whether defendants perceive the plea process and 
outcome as fair.  Prior research argues that individuals 
who perceive case proceedings as fair are more likely to 
view outcomes as fair and report overall satisfaction with 
their court experience.64 Also, procedures that provide 
defendants with the opportunity to have a voice and 
participate in the decisions made in their case are more 
likely to feel fairly treated, respected, and valued by court 
actors.65 In this study, however, most defendants did not 
report a sense of participation in their case; yet, over two-
thirds of defendants perceived both the plea procedures 
                                               
64 CASPER, supra note 24; Casper, supra note 13. 
65 Christopher Campbell et al., supra note 51, at 759; Casper, 
supra note 13. 
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and outcome of their case as fair. In fact, most defendants 
spoke positively about the outcomes of their case and 
believed that they received sanctions that were deserved 
and less severe than they had anticipated. Defendants 
perceived their court experience as fair because it 
mirrored other defendants’ experiences; for the most 
part, defendants felt that they were all treated the same, 
for the good and the bad.  
 Yet, defendants in this study did not necessarily 
feel that they were treated well or fairly by their public 
defenders. Defendants who expressed both positive and 
negative perceptions of public defender behavior, 
however, attributed the behavior to the social and 
situational circumstances of the courts. Attribution 
theories argue that people make distinctions between 
persons and their social situations.66 Social attributions 
occur when individual behavior is interpreted in terms of 
situational forces and, particularly, when an individual 
is a member of a group.  For example, Vincent Yzerbyt 
and Anouk Rogier argue that “social attribution is 
especially likely to be at work when perceivers believe 
that they are confronted with a clear social entity, a 
coherent whole,” and that social attribution is “of 
paramount importance for the rationalization and 
justification function of stereotypes.”67 Defendants in this 
study attributed the behaviors of public defenders to the 
“system”—public defender behavior is therefore a 
consequence of being a worker in “The Public Defender’s 
Office” which is funded by “The State” or “The System.” 
The legitimacy of public defenders as figures of authority 
                                               
66 See generally Daniel T. Gilbert, Ordinary Personology, in 2 
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 89 (Daniel T. Gilbert, 
Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
67 Vincent Yzerbyt & Anouk Rogier, Blame It on the Group: 
Entitativity, Subjective Essentialism, and Social Attribution, in 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON 
IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 103, 105 
(John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001). 
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is contextualized by defendant beliefs about the court 
system. Defendants viewed public defenders as acting 
legitimately or, at the very least, consistently in this 
social context—i.e., eager to plead defendants guilty, 
disinclined to give them much time, and not concerned 
about their welfare. In this regard, although defendants 
do not trust the motives of public defenders—because 
they are dictated by the system—they trust that they will 
receive the legal representation of an overburdened 
public defender. 
 Importantly, defendant attitudes toward the 
procedures and outcome of their case are not necessarily 
contingent on perceptions of fairness or trust of public 
defenders. Defendants do not feel as if they receive fair 
treatment or necessarily trust public defenders to 
represent their best interests, but they express 
satisfaction with the plea process and outcomes. Process-
based models of regulation state that defendants who 
lack confidence in their lawyer are not only likely to 
harbor negative feelings about the law but are also more 
likely to resist the lawyer’s and court’s advice regarding 
the implications of future non-law-abiding behavior.68 
Past research notes that defendants often lay full blame 
for the faults of the system on their public defender.69 The 
findings of this research, however, argue that defendants 
contextualize the behaviors of their public defender. 
Public defenders are criticized and often blamed by 
defendants, but they are also seen as part of a larger 
system that is out of both the public defender’s and the 
defendant’s control. Thus, the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system is questioned by defendants more so than 
                                               
68 TYLER & HUO, supra note 31; Tyler, supra note 31, at 311; 
Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 31, at 515; Tyler & Wakslak, 
supra note 31, at 259.  
69 CASPER, supra note 24, at 85; Roy B. Flemming, Client 
Games: Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their Relations with 
Criminal Clients, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 253, 258 (1986); 
Casper, supra note 55, at 6. 
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the actual behaviors of public defenders and the 
relationships they establish with defendants. 
 Defendant evaluations of the courts are also not 
necessarily contingent on their experiences and 
evaluations of law enforcement. Research consistently 
finds that poor individuals, especially minorities, 
embrace negative attitudes about police, which is based 
on personal experiences and the experiences of others in 
their community.70 Many scholars argue that legal 
perspectives are created through interactions with law 
enforcement; negative perceptions of police practices spill 
over to other areas of the criminal justice and political 
systems.71 Yet, this may not always be the case. In this 
project, defendants spoke unexpectedly and at length 
about police misconduct. Defendants complained first 
and foremost about their treatment by police and the 
fairness of the charges against them. This is to say that, 
for the most part, defendants blamed law enforcement for 
their status as a defendant in a criminal case and 
subsequently viewed the courts as “just doing their job.” 
This finding may be negative or positive depending on 
how it is interpreted. On the one hand, defendants can 
differentiate between criminal justice institutions, their 
role in their criminal process, and their treatment by 
criminal justice personnel, indicating that the legitimacy 
of the criminal justice and political systems are not 
necessarily always overshadowed by the actions of law 
enforcement. On the other hand, this finding may 
indicate that the poor may be so disillusioned by police 
practices that they can only interpret court experiences 
                                               
70 Elaine B. Sharp & Paul E. Johnson, Accounting for Variation 
in Distrust of Local Police, 26 JUST. Q. 157, 159–60 (2009); 
Hurwitz & Peffley, supra note 37, at 781; Weitzer & Tuch 
(2002), supra note 37, at 442–43; Weitzer & Tuch (1999), supra 
note 37, at 502; Scaglion & Condon, supra note 37, at 486, 489. 
71 TYLER, supra note 42, at 95; Bobo & Thompson, supra note 
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as more positive than their experiences with the police. 
 In generalizing these findings to the total 
population of defendants, we note that this research 
relies only on adult criminal defendants located in a mid-
sized Midwestern town. Defendants in smaller or larger 
areas may have different court experiences. Sentencing 
guidelines also vary by state, and, as the first state to 
implement determinant sentencing, Minnesota may not 
reflect the practices of states that still rely on 
indeterminate sentencing practices. Sentencing rules 
and guidelines may, in turn, significantly affect 
defendant experiences and decisions. For example, 
defendants in Hennepin County speak openly about 
situating their decisions and experiences within the 
boundaries of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines (i.e. 
“the grid”). Therefore, while defendants may not feel 
satisfied with their outcome, they feel fairly treated 
because they assume that guidelines guarantee that 
similar defendants receive similar outcomes.  
 At the same time, this research includes only 
those defendants who are represented by a public 
defender. Individuals represented by public defenders 
are the largest and most socially disadvantaged 
population of defendants in the criminal courts. Unlike 
indigent defendants, affluent defendants may be more 
likely to hire a private attorney and afford the costs of 
childcare and time away from work, which defendants in 
this study indicated as key considerations to accepting a 
plea of guilty. More affluent individuals are also less 
reliant on governmental assistance, which often 
stipulates that an individual may not receive assistance 
if they have a criminal conviction. Due to these 
differences in circumstances, it is likely that the decision-
making considerations and processes of defendants in 
this research are different than the population of 
defendants who are not represented by public defenders. 
 Despite the limitations of this research, the 
implications are significant. This research shows that 
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defendants plead guilty because they are confused, 
scared, and feel coerced. Since plea bargaining was first 
implemented over a century ago, scholars have argued 
that the process creates a coercive atmosphere for 
defendants—defendants feel that they have to plead 
guilty or risk receiving a more severe sentence at trial, 
even if they are innocent.72 The findings of this research 
support this argument, with defendants expressing fear 
of taking their case to trial. Even those defendants who 
originally enter a plea of not guilty with the intention to 
pursue a trial ultimately plead guilty out of fear that the 
outcome at trial might result in more significant 
consequences. While Minnesota does not have a strict 
guideline rule that reduces sentences for those who plead 
guilty, public defenders rely heavily on sentencing 
guidelines and grids to illustrate minimum and 
maximum sentences to defendants. Public defenders may 
not insist that defendants take a plea bargain; however, 
they do adamantly remind defendants that if they do not 
accept a plea, they may go to trial and receive the 
maximum sentence. In the most direct situations, 
defenders openly inform defendants that the judge has 
indicated that if they take the case to trial, that they will 
be given the maximum sentence allowed by law. 
 Our findings also indicate that fairness is not 
monolithic and can take on different meanings across 
individuals who are accused of a crime. For example, 
defendants in this study were most likely to associate the 
even distribution of justice—outcomes and procedures—
with fairness. This finding is contrary to research by 
Tyler and colleagues that found that defendants did not 
define their experience based on their ability to 
participate and have input in the procedures of their 
                                               
72 Bowers, supra note 22, at 1120; McCoy, supra note 22, at 69; 
Bibas, supra note 7, at 2531; Langbein, supra note 10, at 16 
(citing People v. Byrd, 162 N.W.2d 777, 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1968) (Levin, J., concurring)). 
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case.73 Most frequently, defendants relied on the fair 
application of the law in their case. This result is 
particularly compelling when considered in light of 
research showing disparity in arrests and sentencing 
severity between black and white individuals and, 
particularly, those charged with drug and property 
offenses.74 This finding may be less surprising, however, 
when we consider that the poor are far more likely to be 
the subject of unfair and discriminatory treatment on a 
daily basis and in their own communities. As Merry 
argues, most lower-class Americans believe that society 
is unfair, unjust, and that everyone’s rights are not 
equally protected.75 Therefore, when poor defendants 
receive unsatisfactory treatment from the courts, they 
are not alienated—they are perhaps not even aware of 
being treated unfairly—because the experience is similar 
to experiences with other state actors and institutions.76 
As some of the most socially marginalized individuals in 
our society, poor defendants do not expect to have a voice 
or to receive the same treatment as individuals with more 
social status. They do not have the expectation that law 
officials will give them and their story adequate 
consideration, and they do not consider criminal courts 
as a space in which their self-value and identity is 
defined.   
 Perhaps the most important implication of this 
                                               
73 LIND & TYLER, supra note 27, at 216; Tyler & Bies, supra note 
54, at 89. 
74 DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER THE LAW: RACE IN 
THE WAR ON DRUGS (2007); WESTERN, supra note 36, at 50. 
75 Sally E. Merry, Concepts of Law and Justice Among Working-
Class Americans: Ideology as Culture, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 59, 68–
69 (1985). 
76 JOE SOSS ET AL., DISCIPLINING THE POOR: NEOLIBERAL 
PATERNALISM AND THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE 181 (2011); 
COLE, supra note 36, at 8; Austin Sarat, “. . . The Law Is All 
Over”: Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the 
Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 374 (1990). 
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research, therefore, is that criminal justice reforms are 
needed to ensure the rights of indigent defendants. Once 
indigent defendants are swept into the criminal courts, 
they are required to navigate a system that they do not 
understand. Defendants are required to make quick 
decisions that have significant implications on their lives, 
families, and communities; however, their decisions are 
bounded by limited information and an incomplete 
comprehension of the procedures and meanings of 
sentences. Plea bargaining allows agents of the court to 
move through cases quickly and rationalize that plea 
bargains are fair because defendants make the decision 
to plead guilty. This research shows that we should not 
presume such a simplistic and idealistic conclusion. 
Future research should consider how we can strengthen 
the position of defendants by providing defendants access 
to dispositional advisors, or staff that are available to 
counsel defendants about their decision-making 
processes. If courts are not capable of providing 
defendants adequate representation and informed 
decision-making, this research suggests that we need to 
reconceptualize the meaning of “fairness” in the court 
system.   
 Finally, this research speaks to the current state 
of our criminal courts and their reliance on the plea 
process. Over the past few decades, scholars have focused 
on sentencing, incarceration, and the reentry of 
prisoners, to the neglect of investigations into indigent 
defense representation and the processes of criminal 
courts. The lack of attention to and investment in 
ensuring the rights of defendants and the quality of legal 
representation is startling considering the continued 
support for “tough on crime” policies that increase the 
stakes for a staggering number of individuals whose lives 
are affected by the courts. Yet, and in despite of these 
changes, this research offers evidence that indicates that 
defendant attitudes have remained relatively stable over 
time. In particular, the results of this research 
complement early studies of defendants. In the 1970s, 
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Casper noted that not only did defendants speak 
positively about the plea process, but that most 
defendants preferred to “cop out” and accept a plea: “the 
defendant doesn’t see himself as giving up anything of 
great value: he is simply speaking words, and they don’t 
seem to mean very much.”77 Although interactions with 
the criminal justice system and the severity of sanctions 
have increased, it does not appear to be the case that 
defendant experiences or expectations of what the courts 
can offer has changed much at all.   
 Future research and policy reforms should focus 
attention to increasing defendants’ understanding of 
their court experiences. We should also consider how 
defendant attitudes towards the fairness of their 
procedures and outcomes vary over time. As time passes, 
defendants may learn new information about court 
processes or experience the ramifications of their 
disposition in different ways. Consequences of criminal 
cases that have additional impacts over time may lead 
people to reconsider their fairness evaluations. As one 
defendant indicated, “At the time it was really about 
being fair. I mean, I don’t really know looking back on it 
if I consider it to be a fair deal. But at the time, it was 
just kinda like . . . what I get is what I get type of thing.”  
 This research offers a unique and important 
perspective of our courts. In doing so, it begs the question 
whether we should be expecting more from our courts or 
be satisfied to know that most defendants perceive their 
treatment as “fair enough.” In many regards, it is 
possible that most defendants cannot even conceptualize 
what “justice” might look like in the court system, given 
that the majority are represented by attorneys who are 
overworked, underpaid, and have little time to give 
adequate attention to each case. Given the infrequency of 
trials, most defendants have no point of comparison to 
the plea process. This is difficult to assess, but it is 
                                               
77 CASPER, supra note 24, at 85. 
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conceivable that if we increased our expectations of fair 
treatment by law enforcement and other institutional 
actors, the standards of court experiences would not be 
set so low. This research asserts that most defendants are 
satisfied with the procedures and outcomes of their cases, 
but it does not imply that defendants perceive the court 
system to care about their well-being or the implications 
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Over the last decade or so, federal and state education 
policymakers embraced the use of value-added models 
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termination of employment). VAMs are complicated 
statistical models that attempt to estimate a teacher’s 
contribution to student test scores, particularly those in 
mathematics and reading. Educational researchers, as 
well as many teachers and unions, however, have objected 
to the use of VAMs noting that these models fail to 
adequately account for variables outside of teachers’ 
control that contribute to a student’s education 
performance. Subsequently, many teachers challenged the 
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 In March of 2017, William “Bill” Sanders passed 
away in Tennessee.1 To most policymakers outside of 
education (and many within it) he was a relatively 
unknown statistician. His work in education policy 
started far away from schoolhouses. Indeed, after he 
received his degree in statistics at the University of 
Tennessee, he began assessing the impact of radiation on 
farm animals.2  
But his career trajectory changed markedly. In 
1982, after reading a newspaper article about how 
Tennessee Governor Lamar Alexander sought a model of 
teacher compensation that would pay teachers for 
performance, Mr. Sanders concluded he had the answer.3 
He wrote to Alexander explaining that he developed a 
statistical model that could determine who the “best” 
teachers were—a so-called “value-added” model (e.g., the 
Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS) 
                                               
1 Kevin Carey, The Little-Known Statistician Who Taught Us 




2 Id.  
3 Id.  
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which is more generally known as the Education Value-
Added Assessment (EVAAS)).4 This model estimates a 
teacher’s contribution to student achievement on 
standardized tests,5 and it formed the basis for his 
private company that developed algorithms for the 
models.6 Tennessee ultimately incorporated value added 
models into policies and laws, linking high-stakes 
employment decisions and evaluation to student test 
scores.7 
 Mr. Sanders’s models—sparked by this random 
collision of events—has had profound impact on national 
educational policy. In 2009, President Obama’s Race to 
the Top (RttT) program conditioned state receipt of 
federal education dollars on states’ use of VAMs to 
evaluate and make employment decisions for teachers. 
States seeking much-needed federal money during the 
                                               
4 Id. VAMs have a policy history that precede Mr. Sanders’s 
adoption of the term in education. They had been used in 
economics since the 1960s. See, e.g, Douglas Harris, Would 
Accountability Based on Teacher Value Added Be Smart 
Policy? An Examination of the Statistical Properties and Policy 
Alternatives, 4 J. EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 319, 321 (2009). Yet 
Sanders is widely credited as the one who popularized the use 
of VAMs for educational accountability. E.g., Carey supra note 
1. 
5 E.g., EDWARD WILEY, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO VALUE 




6 SAS® EVAAS® FOR K-12, https://www.sas.com/en_si/ 
software/evaas.html [https://perma.cc/65TE-VEFG] (crediting 
the development of this particular model sold by a private 
company to Mr. Sanders).  
7 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-302(a)(2)(C), 49-5-503(4) (2016); 
TENN. STATE BD. OF EDUC., TEACHER AND ADMINISTRATOR 
POLICY § 5.201 (2017) (statutory and regulatory framework 
delegating authority to state department of education to 
develop policy for evaluation and further linking that 
evaluation to tenure determinations).   
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“Great Recession” eagerly complied.8 As a consequence, 
VAMs became codified in state teacher evaluation and 
employment laws across the country.9 
 Despite their widespread adoption, the use of 
these statistical models in improving public schools is a 
source of considerable debate in law and policy. Some 
scholars applaud their use, arguing that they provide a 
clear measure of a teacher’s worth and address a 
persistent policy dilemma: How to improve the quality of 
our public school teachers.10 Detractors insist that a 
teacher’s value is much more than the measure of test 
scores and, more importantly, that VAMs are statistically 
flawed.11 Critics note that VAMs fail to account for the 
complexity of teaching and cannot accurately control for 
the impact of other variables (e.g., students’ individual 
                                               
8 See generally Rhoda Freelon et al., Overburdened and 
Underfunded: California Public Schools Amidst the Great 
Recession, 2 MULTIDISCIPLINARY J. EDUC. RES., 152 (2012) 
(documenting the impact of the Great Recession on public 
schools in California, but also noting the broader impact of the 
recession on schools and institutions beyond California).   
9 KATHRYN M. DOHERTY & SANDI JACOBS, STATE OF THE STATES 
2013: CONNECT THE DOTS: USING EVALUATIONS OF TEACHER 
EFFECTIVENESS TO INFORM POLICY AND PRACTICE 10 (2013) 
(noting that in 2013 at least 31 states had adopted the use of 
standardized test in their teacher evaluation protocols); see 
also MARK A. PAIGE, BUILDING A BETTER TEACHER: 
UNDERSTANDING VALUE-ADDED MODELS IN THE LAW OF 
TEACHER EVALUATION 15, 16 (2016) (describing the links 
between teacher evaluation systems and teacher employment 
statutes, such as tenure, and warning against such use for 
high-stakes decisions). 
10 See, e.g., Eric A. Hanushek, Conceptual and Empirical Issues 
in the Estimation of Educational Production Functions, 14 J. 
HUM. RESOURCES 351, 353 (arguing for the adoption of 
production function models to evaluate teachers). 
11 E.g., Linda Darling-Hammond, Can Value-Added Add Value 
to Teacher Evaluation?, 44 EDUC. RESEARCHER 132, 133 
(placing the use of value added models in the larger policy 
debate about how to improve teacher quality). 
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motivation) that impact student achievement.12 Because 
of these issues, commentators cautioned against the use 
of VAMs in high-stakes employment decisions (e.g. 
termination), noting such use would invite legal action.13 
 Notwithstanding these warnings, many states 
embraced VAMs. Florida, for example, amended their 
teacher evaluation statutes to ensure that VAMs played 
a controlling role in teacher employment status, 
including tenure decisions.14 Teachers and unions almost 
immediately challenged the use of VAMs through legal 
means. Lawsuits ranged from violations of the Federal 
Constitution15 to assertions that requirements to use 
VAMs violated the non-delegability doctrine.16 Many of 
these received widespread attention in the popular 
press.17  
                                               
12 Id.; see also SEAN P. CORCORAN, CAN TEACHERS BE 
EVALUATED BY THEIR STUDENTS’ TEST SCORES? SHOULD THEY 
BE? THE USE OF VALUE-ADDED MEASURES OF TEACHER 
EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 22 (2010). 
13 PAIGE, supra note 9, at 22 n.28; see also Preston C. Green III 
et al., The Legal and Policy Implication of Value-Added 
Teacher Assessment Policies, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 15–16 
(2012). 
14 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.22(1)(c)(5) (West 2013) 
(connecting teacher salary to an evaluation system that 
requires use of VAMs).  
15 E.g., Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(alleging use of VAMs violated substantive and procedural due 
process clauses, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the 
14th Amendment).  
16 E.g., State ex rel. Stapleton v. Skandera, 346 P.3d 1191, 1194 
(N.M. App. 2015). 
17 E.g., Peter Greene, Over a Year Ago a Federal Court Struck 
Down VAM: Why Are We Still Using it to Evaluate Teachers?, 
FORBES (June 25, 2018, 08:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/petergreene/2018/06/25/over-a-year-ago-a-federal-court-
struck-down-vam-why-are-we-still-using-it-to-evaluate-teachers/ 
[https://perma.cc/AA4M-NRQ5]; Patricia MacGregor-Mendoza, 
Court Finds Teacher Evaluation System Flawed, LAS CRUCES 
SUN NEWS (May 26, 2017, 07:17 PM), https://www.lcsun-
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 It has been almost ten years since Race to the Top 
brought Mr. Sander’s idea of VAMs from Tennessee to a 
national scale, and it seems an appropriate moment to 
assess their legal and policy ramifications. Indeed, as we 
note, the use of VAMs has triggered a wave of litigation 
and policy change that continues today. Many states 
continue to use VAMs, while others have reduced their 
use under new federal laws.18 Thus, assessing the legal 
and policy landscape forms the basis of this article. 
 Generally speaking, three lines of legal challenges 
have emerged. First, some are grounded in the 
substantive Due Process Clause and Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th Amendment, arguing that the laws do 
not pass rational basis scrutiny.19 Second, a line of cases 
challenges the authority or jurisdiction of a particular 
agency (e.g., state Department of Education) to enact 
evaluation regulations or laws that use VAMs. Third, 
some cases advance what we refer to as “process” 
arguments. These contend that the use of VAMs violates 
some agreed-upon or standing procedural terms found in 
the Procedural Due Process Clause or collective 
bargaining agreements (CBAs). As we note, plaintiffs 
have captured the most success (although not always) on 
this third line of argument. 
 That litigants have experienced more success 
arguing VAMs offend certain procedural protections 
comports with common understanding of procedural due 
                                               
news.com/story/opinion/2017/05/26/court-finds-teacher-
evaluation-system-flawed/102219102/ [https://perma.cc/ESS8-
SXWX];Valerie Strauss, Judge Calls Evaluation of N.Y. 
Teacher “Arbitrary” and “Capricious” in Case Against New U.S. 





18 See infra Part III. 
19 See, e.g., Cook, 792 F.3d at 1298, 1300.  
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process. At its core, procedural due process ensures 
“fundamental fairness” when the government moves to 
take away a protected interest, such as employment. 
While courts generally have not overruled a legislature’s 
policy choice to use VAMs as violative of the substantive 
due process, they (including a federal appeals court case) 
have questioned the wisdom of the legislature’s 
decision.20 Where they have overturned the use of VAMs, 
they have done so on procedural grounds.21 This allows 
courts to stay within “their lane” and avoid jurisdictional 
overreach into the policy area.  
 The article is organized as follows. Part I 
overviews VAMs, their link to teacher evaluation and 
employment, and the controversy surrounding their use, 
especially as a factor in high-stakes employment 
decisions. Part II provides the most current assessment 
of cases where the statistical controversy has led to legal 
action. Part III discusses the recent policy and legal 
developments with respect the use of VAMs in evaluation 
that have occurred because changes in federal education 
law. In conclusion, we note that VAMs have receded, 




II. VAMs: Promise and Controversy  
 
A. A Brief History of VAMs in Educational 
Policy  
 
In the simplest of terms, VAMs (e.g., Tennessee’s 
TVAAS) are statistical models used to measure the 
predicted and the actual “value” a teacher “adds” to (or 
detracts from) student achievement from the point at 
which students enter a teacher’s classroom to the point 
students leave. This is typically done using student 
                                               
20 See id. at 1301.  
21 See id. at 1301–02. 
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achievement growth as measured by large-scale 
standardized test scores (i.e., the tests mandated by the 
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001). The models 
attempt to statistically control for outside variables, 
including students’ prior test performance, and student-
level background variables (e.g., whether students are 
eligible for free-and-reduced lunches).22  
The most widely used VAM is the EVAAS, 
developed and used in Tennessee.23 EVAAS comes in 
different versions for different states (e.g., the EVAAS in 
Ohio, North Carolina, and South Carolina, the PVAAS in 
Pennsylvania, the TVAAS in Tennessee, and the 
TxVAAS in Texas) and different ones based on large and 
small school districts (e.g., located within Arkansas, 
Georgia, Indiana, Texas, and Virginia). For each 
consumer, EVAAS modelers choose one of two 
sophisticated statistical models.24  
Using these models, student growth scores are 
aggregated at the teacher or classroom level to yield 
teacher-level value-added estimates. Depending on where 
                                               
22 See e.g., Sean Corcoran & Dan Goldhaber, Value Added and 
Its Uses: Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit, 8 EDUC. 
FIN. & POL’Y 418, 421 (2013). Other variables include things 
such as, English language learners (ELLs), gifted, receiving 
special education services, and classroom and school-level 
variables (e.g., class sizes, school resources, school leadership). 
23 The EVAAS is advertised as “the most comprehensive 
reporting package of value-added metrics available in the 
educational market” in that the EVAAS offers states, districts, 
and schools “precise, reliable and unbiased results that go far 
beyond what other simplistic [value-added] models found in the 
market today can provide.” SAS® EVAAS ® FOR K-12, 
https://www.sas.com/en_us/software/evaas.html [https://perma.cc/ 
76AY-G47W]. 
24 For a comprehensive statistical summation of the various 
models and options available, see WHITE PAPER: SAS® 
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teachers’ EVAAS estimates fall, as compared to similar 
teachers to whom they are compared (e.g., within 
districts) at the same time, teachers’ value-added 
determinations are made.25 Thereafter, EVAAS modelers 
make relativistic comparisons and rank teachers 
hierarchically along a continuum.26 Teachers whose 
students grow significantly more than the average and/or 
surpass projected levels of growth are identified as 
“adding value”; teachers whose students grow 
significantly less and/or fall short of projected levels are 
identified as “detracting value.”27 Teachers whose 
students grow at rates that are not statistically different 
from average (i.e., falling within one standard deviation 
of the mean) are classified as Not Detectibly Different 
(NDD).28 
  
1. The Rise of VAMs in National Education 
Policy: Race to the Top  
 
In 2007, TVAAS/EVAAS entered the national 
education policy discussion when developer Dr. William 
L. Sanders shared his research with Congress. 
Specifically, he testified before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Education and the 
Workforce on how TVAAS could improve teacher 
                                               
25 For a general overview of the use of VAMs and the concepts 
noted herein, see WILEY, supra note 5.  
26 Id.  
27 Id.; Audrey Amrein-Beardsley & Clarin Collins, The SAS 
Education Value-Added Assessment System (SAS® EVAAS®) 
in the Houston Independent School District (HISD): Intended 
and Unintended Consequences, 20 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
ARCHIVES,  no. 12, Apr. 2012, at 1, 7 n.2.  
28  WILEY, supra note 5; Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, supra 
note 27, at 7 n.2; see, e.g., WILLIAM L. SANDERS, COMPARISONS 
AMONG VARIOUS EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT VALUE-ADDED 
MODELS 18 (2006).  
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accountability and promote educational reform.29 His 
testimony spurred the U.S. Department of Education’s 
piloting of VAMs.30  
The use of VAMs nationally grew under the Race 
to the Top program. By way of background, RttT was a 
competitive federal grant program that amounted to an 
injection of $4.35 billion to selected states to support 
educational reform efforts.31 Receipt of the grant was 
conditioned on states developing teacher evaluation laws 
and policy that used VAMs.32 States that attached 
relatively more serious consequences (e.g., employment 
status) to teachers’ VAM-based output were viewed more 
favorably than those that did not.33 High-stakes 
consequences included, but were not limited to: teachers’ 
permanent files being flagged, thus preventing teachers 
from changing jobs within states; the revocation of 
teacher licenses; teacher tenure; salary increases, 
decreases, and merit pay; and teacher probation and 
termination.34 
Beyond RttT, the federal government used other 
mechanisms to embed VAMs in state evaluation and 
employment matters as a matter of law and policy. In 
2011, the federal government required that states adopt 
the accountability practices discussed above 
                                               
29 CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON & JANELLE BARLAGE, INFLUENCE: 
A STUDY OF THE FACTORS SHAPING EDUCATION POLICY 41 
(2016), https://secure.edweek.org/media/influence_study.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/346S-HJSX]. 
30 Id.  




33 Arne Duncan, Sec’y, Dep’t of Educ., Remarks at The Race to 
the Top Program Announcement: The Race to the Top Begins 
(July 4, 2009), https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/race-top-begins 
[https://perma.cc/3RD5-RP7A]. 
34 See generally PAIGE, supra note 9 (noting that VAMs became 
required factors for employment decisions). 
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(notwithstanding if a state applied or received RttT 
funds) to secure waivers from the penalties that they 
would incur for non-compliance with the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001.35 NCLB, passed with bipartisan 
support in 2001, required 100 percent of students to 
attain proficiency in math and reading state 
standardized tests.36 The utopian goal has been widely 
criticized as impractical.37 Nevertheless, the federal 
government required states to submit waivers to escape 
the punitive measures of non-compliance (e.g., 
intervention of state authorities in the operation of local 
schools). More specifically, these waivers buttressed the 
core policy drivers of RttT by continuing to incorporate 
student test scores as a means to hold teachers 
accountable for their “value added,” or lack thereof.38  
The cumulative impact of RttT and federal 
waivers on the use of VAMs in teacher evaluations was 
substantial. By 2014, 40 states and Washington, D.C., 
                                               
35 KEVIN CLOSE ET AL., STATE-LEVEL ASSESSMENTS AND 
TEACHER EVALUATION SYSTEMS AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE 
EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: SOME STEPS IN THE RIGHT 
DIRECTION 5 (Nat’l Educ. Policy Ctr. ed., 2018), 
https://nepc.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PB%20C
lose-Beardsley-Collins_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG4N-B8N2]. 
36 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 
1001, 115 Stat. 1425 (requiring all students obtain proficiency 
in specified test areas) (repealed 2015).  
37 See, e.g., Bruce Meredith & Mark A. Paige, Opinion, 
Rethinking Federal Role in Education Makes Sense. Trump’s 
Plan Does Not, ATLANTA J.-CONST.: GET SCHOOLED (Oct. 3, 
2018, 11:15 AM) https://www.myajc.com/blog/get-schooled/ 
opinion-rethinking-fed-education-role-makes-sense-trump-plan-
does-not/T19cWlKAznnDpcoxmvr1nJ/ [https://perma.cc/S3J4-
B4FW] (characterizing the NCLB goal of proficiency as 
unrealistic, especially in light of the lack of support from the 
federal government to education and other important public 
policy areas that impact education success, like housing and 
health care).  
38 CLOSE ET AL., supra note 35, at 8. 
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(80%) were using or still developing some type of VAM for 
increased teacher accountability purposes.39 While state 
department of education leaders recognized and 
encouraged the use of VAMs, they did not develop 
support mechanisms and resources to help teachers 
understand and subsequently use their VAM-based data 
to improve their effectiveness.40 Put differently, 
information from VAMs was not actionable. This 
disconnect has been the source of serious contention and 
concern about the VAM-based teacher and educational 
reform enterprise. 
 
B. Statistical and Practical Controversies 
 
Significant statistical and practical concerns 
surround VAMs, and these are best understood with 
reference to the professional guidelines that govern 
education and psychological professions, the Standards 
for Educational and Psychological Testing41 (hereinafter 
“Standards”). These issues include, but are not limited to: 
(1) reliability, (2) validity, (3) bias, (4) transparency, and 
(5) fairness, with emphasis also on (6) whether VAMs are 
being used to make consequential decisions using 
concrete (e.g., not arbitrary) evidence, and (7) unintended 




Reliability is the degree to which test- or 
measurement-based scores “are consistent over repeated 
applications of a measurement procedure (e.g., a VAM) 
and hence and inferred to be dependable and consistent” 
                                               
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 14. 
41 AM. EDUC. RESEARCH ASS’N, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N & 
NAT’L COUNCIL ON MEASUREMENT IN EDUC., STANDARDS FOR 
EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (2014) 
[hereinafter STANDARDS].  
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for the individuals (e.g., teachers) to whom the scores 
pertain.42 VAMs are reliable when within-group (same 
school or district) VAM estimates of teacher effectiveness 
are more or less consistent over time, from one year to 
the next, regardless of the type of students and subject 
areas teachers teach. Consistency over time is typically 
captured using particular statistical tools such as 
standard errors, reliability coefficients per se, and 
generalizability coefficients, among others.43 These 
situate and make explicit VAM estimates and their 
(sometimes sizeable) errors and, importantly, help others 
understand the errors that come along with VAM 
estimates. 
Research has documented serious concerns with 
respect to VAM reliability (or intemporal stability). 
Indeed, teachers classified as “effective” one year might 
have a 25–59% chance of being classified as “ineffective” 
the next year, or vice versa, with other permutations 
possible.44 If a teacher who is classified as a “strong” 
teacher this year is classified as a “weak” teacher next 
year, and vice versa, this casts doubt on the reliability of 
VAMs for the purpose of identifying and making high-
stakes decisions regarding teachers. Accordingly, across 
VAM, reliability is a hindrance, especially when 
unreliable measures are to be used for consequential 
purposes like decisions to terminate or deny tenure. 
  
  
                                               
42 Id. at 222–23.    
43 Id. at 33. 
44  For a comprehensive overview of these concepts, see José 
Felipe Martínez et al., Approaches for Combining Multiple 
Measures of Teacher Performance: Reliability, Validity, and 
Implications for Evaluation Policy, 38 EDUC. EVALUATION & 
POL’Y ANALYSIS 738-56 (2016); see also Peter Z. Schochet & 
Hanley S. Chiang, What are Error Rates for Classifying 
Teacher and School Performance Using Value-Added Models?, 
38 J. EDUC. & BEHAV. STAT. 142-71 (2013).  
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Validity is “the degree to which evidence and 
theory support the interpretations of test scores for [the] 
proposed uses of tests.”45 It is measured by “the degree to 
which all the accumulated evidence supports the 
intended interpretation of [the test-based] scores for 
[their] proposed use[s].”46 Put another way, validity asks: 
Does the model assess what it is supposed to assess?47 
Accordingly, one must be able to support validity 
arguments with quantitative or qualitative evidence that 
the data derived allows for accurate inferences.  
There are various means to assess validity, but of 
particular focus for researchers is validity as it concerns 
“concurrent-related evidences.”48 This helps to assess, for 
example, whether teachers who post large and small 
                                               
45 STANDARDS, supra note 41, at 11.  
46 Id. at 14.  
47 There are sub areas of validity that have been the subject of 
considerable research as it relates to VAMs.  
These are: (1) content-related evidence of validity; (2) 
concurrent-related evidence of validity; (3) predictive-related 
evidence of validity; and (4) consequence-related evidence of 
validity. See Michael T. Kane, Validating the Interpretations 
and Uses of Test Scores, 50 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 1, 2, 8 
(2013); see generally Samuel Messick, Validity, 3 J. EDUC. 
MEASUREMENT 1, 8–103 (1989). However, while all these 
evidences of validity help to support construct-related evidence 
of validity, in VAM research most researchers rely on 
gathering concurrent-related evidence of validity. 
48 E.g., Edward Sloat, Audrey Amrein-Beardsley & Jessica 
Holloway, Different Teacher-Level Effectiveness Estimates, 
Different Results: Inter-Model Concordance Across Six 
Generalized Value-Added Models (VAMs), 30 EDUC. 
ASSESSMENT EVALUATION & ACCOUNTABILITY 367, 372 (2018); 
see also Pam Grossman et al., The Test Matters: The 
Relationship Between Classroom Observation Scores and 
Teacher Value Added on Multiple Types of Assessment, 43 
EDUC. RESEARCHER 293, 293-303 (2014). 
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value-added gains or losses over time are the same 
teachers deemed effective or ineffective, respectively, 
over the same period using other independent 
quantitative and qualitative measures of teacher 
effectiveness. Other measures might include supervisors’ 
observational scores. If all measures line up and 
theoretically validate one another, then confidence in 
them as independent measures increases.49 If all 
indicators point in different directions, something may be 
wrong with either or both indicators (the VAM tool or 
observational scores, or both).50  
Researchers have questioned whether measures 
of teacher value-added are substantively related to at 
least one other criterion of teacher effectiveness (e.g., 
teacher observational or student survey indicators).51 
Moreover, they question whether the concurrent-related 
evidence of validity that does exist is strong or 




Bias pertains to the validity of the inferences that 
stakeholders draw from test-based scores.52 Specific to 
                                               
49 Kane, supra note 47, at 6–8, 37, 40, 64. 
50 Id.  
51 E.g., Morgan S. Polikoff & Andrew C. Porter, Instructional 
Alignment as a Measure of Teaching Quality, 36 EDUC. 
EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 399, 399–401 (2014); Tanner 
LeBaron Wallace, Benjamin Kelcey & Erik Ruzek, What Can 
Student Perception Surveys Tell Us About Teaching? 
Empirically Testing the Underlying Structure of the Tripod 
Student Perception Survey, 53 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 1834, 1835, 
1837–38 (2016). 
52 The Standards define bias as follows: as the “construct 
underrepresentation of construct-irrelevant components of test 
scores that differentially affect the performance of different 
groups of test takers and consequently the . . . validity of 
interpretations and uses of their test scores.” STANDARDS, 
supra note 41, at 216. Biased estimates, also known as 
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VAMs, unpredictable characteristics (variables outside of 
the control of a teacher or school) of students can bias 
estimates about teachers’ contributions. Student 
characteristics include: students’ individual motivation, 
capability to learn, and levels of academic achievement.53 
Because schools do not randomly assign teachers, these 
variables are not controlled in a way to mitigate bias.54 
Biased results are quite possible, especially when 
relatively homogeneous sets of students (e.g., English 
Language Learners (ELLs), gifted and special education 
students, or free-or-reduced lunch eligible students) are 
non-randomly concentrated into schools, purposefully 
placed into classrooms, or both. 
Statistical models—even the most sophisticated—
cannot control for such bias.55 One influential study 
illustrated VAM-based bias when it found that a 
                                               
systematic error as concerning “[t]he systematic over- or 
under-prediction of criterion performance” are observed when 
said criterion performance varies for “people belonging to 
groups differentiated by characteristics not relevant to the 
criterion performance” of measurement. STANDARDS, supra 
note 41, at 216, 222.  
53 See generally Noelle A. Paufler & Audrey Amrein-Beardsley, 
The Random Assignment of Students into Elementary 
Classrooms: Implications for Value-Added Analyses and 
Interpretations, 51 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 328, 328–62 (2014). 
54 See, e.g., Charles T. Clotfelter, Helen F. Ladd, & Jacob L. 
Vigdor, Teacher-Student Matching and the Assessment of 
Teacher Effectiveness, J. HUM. RESOURCES 778, 779–82 (2006) 
(noting the various ways teachers are assigned to schools). 
Class assignments in schools are historically a function of a 
host of factors, including: pressure from parents for particular 
class placement and pressure from teachers for placement of 
particular students, especially those who may tend to be 
considered “high-achieving.” Id. at 781. Additionally, 
placement among schools within a district is similarly subject 
to other variables, such as housing patterns. Id.  
55 See, e.g., Paufler & Amrein-Beardsley, supra note 53, at 
335.  
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student’s 5th grade teacher was a better predictor of a 
student’s 4th grade growth than was the student’s 4th 
grade teacher.56 The absurdity of that finding raises 
serious questions about the ability of VAMs to control for 
bias. Notwithstanding, the primary debate raging across 
articles concerns whether statistically controlling for 
potential bias by using complex statistical approaches to 
account for non-random student assignment makes bias 




Transparency is defined as the extent to which 
something is accessible and understandable.58 In terms 
of VAMs, this relates to the extent to which VAM-based 
estimates may not make sense to those receiving the 
information. In education, teachers and principals may 
not understand the models being used to evaluate their 
performance. Because of this, they are generally unlikely 
to use the VAM-generated information for formative 
purposes (i.e., as a tool to gather information and change 
practice as soon as possible).59 Practitioners often 
                                               
56 Jesse Rothstein, Student Sorting and Bias in Value-added 
Estimation: Selection and Observables and Unobservables, 4 
EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 537, 546–47 (2009); Jesse Rothstein, 
Teacher Quality in Educational Production, Q.J. ECON. 175, 
210 (2010). 
57 Sean Reardon & Stephen Raudenbush, Assumptions of 
Value-Added Models for Estimating School Effects, 4 EDUC. 
FIN. & POL’Y 492, 496–97 (2009).  
58 STANDARDS, supra note 44. 
59 Jonathan M. Eckert & Joan Dabrowski, Should Value-Added 
Measures Be Used for Performance Pay?, KAPPAN, May 2010, 
at 88, 89–90; Rachel Gabriel & Jessica Nina Lester, Sentinels 
Guarding the Grail: Value-Added Measurement and the Quest 
for Education Reform, 21 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 
1–30 (2013); Ellen Goldring et al., Make Room Value Added: 
Principals’ Human Capital Decisions and the Emergence of 
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describe value-add data reports as confusing, not 
comprehensive in terms of the key concepts and 
objectives taught, ambiguous regarding teachers’ efforts 
at both the student and composite levels, and often 
received months after students leave teachers’ 
classrooms. 
For example, teachers in Houston, Texas, 
expressed that they are learning little about what they 
did effectively or how they might use their value-added 
data to improve their instruction.60 Teachers in North 
Carolina reported that they were “weakly to moderately” 
familiar with their value-added data.61 Tennessee 
teachers maintained that there was very limited support 
or explanation helping teachers use their value-added 
data to improve upon their practice.62  
Quite apart from the statistical concerns noted 
above, the “black-box” nature of VAMs raises additional 
questions in the field. Indeed, the purported strength of 
VAMs is that they will improve instruction by providing 
a wealth of positive diagnostic information. The models 
are supposed to give practitioners useful, actionable 
information. Yet, if practitioners have problems 
understanding the models, the value (if you will) of VAMs 
is greatly diminished. Unfortunately, statisticians that 
have developed the models make “no apologies for the 
                                               
Teacher Observation Data, 44 EDUC. RESEARCHER 96, 96–97 
(2015).  
60 Clarin Collins, Houston, We Have a Problem: Teachers Find 
No Value in the SAS Education Value-Added Assessment 
System, 22 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 4, 15, 22 (2014). 
61 Kim Kappler Hewitt, Educator Evaluation Policy That 
Incorporates EVAAS Value-Added Measures: Undermined 
Intentions and Exacerbated Inequities, 23 EDUC. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 11 (2015). 
62 See Eckert & Dabrowski, supra note 59, at 90. 
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fact that [their] methods [are] too complex for most of the 




General questions of fairness have been raised 
concerning the use of VAMs, especially in the context of 
high-stakes employment decisions. Fairness is the 
impartiality of “test score interpretations for intended 
use(s) for individuals from all relevant subgroups.”64 But 
issues of fairness arise when a test or test use impacts 
some more than others in unfair or prejudiced, yet often 
consequential ways.65 
Fairness issues are amplified as VAMs are 
applied in the field. Indeed, VAMs are generally only 
directly applicable to teachers who instruct in areas that 
are subjected to standardized tests (typically, math and 
reading).66 States and districts can only produce VAM-
based estimates for approximately 30–40% of all 
teachers.67 The other 60–70%, which sometimes includes 
entire campuses of teachers (e.g., early elementary and 
high school teachers) or teachers who do not teach the 
core subject areas assessed using large-scale 
standardized tests (e.g., mathematics and 
English/language arts), cannot be evaluated or held 
accountable using teacher-level value-added data.68 
Importantly, when districts use this information to make 
                                               
63 Carey, supra note 1, at 13; see also Gabriel & Lester, supra 
note 59, at 20.  
64 STANDARDS, supra note 41, at 219 (emphasis added).  
65 This concern is consistent with the general argument of this 
paper. To wit, courts have sustained objections to the use of 
VAMs where they violate procedural due process, the basic 
“fundamental fairness.” See Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294, 
1301 (11th Cir. 2015). 
66 E.g., Green et al., supra note 13 (noting that the models only 
apply to 30–40% of teachers). 
67 Id.; see also Gabriel & Lester, supra note 59, at 7.  
68 Green et al., supra note 13, at 15, 27–28.  
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consequential, high-stakes employment decisions the 
unfairness can have considerable consequences. Some 
teachers in certain grades or subject areas experience the 
negative or positive consequences of these VAM-based 
data more than their colleagues.69 
  
6. Consequential Use 
 
Assessing the appropriate use of tests must 
consider the social and ethical concerns70 in addition to 
more sterile concerns about statistical methodology.71 
The Standards recommend ongoing evaluation of both 
the intended and unintended consequences of any test as 
an essential part of any test-based system, including 
those based upon VAMs.72 
Typically, ongoing evaluation of social and ethical 
consequences rests on the shoulders of the governmental 
bodies that mandate such test-based policies.73 In this 
case, local and state education departments would be the 
agencies in charge of assessing the social costs and 
ethical issues associated with the use of VAMs in high-
stakes contexts. This is because they “provide resources 
for a continuing program of research and for 
dissemination of research findings concerning both the 
                                               
69 This has formed the basis of substantive due process claims 
against school districts. E.g., Cook, 792 F.3d 1294 (agreeing 
that the system of Florida that adopted VAM ratings that apply 
to all teachers, including those in non-tested subject areas, was 
unwise and unfair but upholding it under rational basis test).  
70 E.g., Messick, supra note 47, at 8 noting that “[t]he only form 
of validity evidence [typically] bypassed or neglected in these 
traditional formulations is that which bears on the social 
consequences of test interpretation and use.”  
71 See also Kane, supra note 47. 
72 STANDARDS, supra note 41. 
73 Id.  
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positive and the negative effects of the testing 
program.”74  
However, this rarely occurs. The burden typically 
rests on the research community who must provide 
evidence about the positive and negative effects and 
explain these effects to external constituencies, including 
policymakers. This group must collectively determine 
whether VAM use, given the consequences and issues 
identified above, warrant the financial, time, and human 
resource investments.75 Local and state departments of 
education typically have not (perhaps for political 
reasons) acknowledged or sought to examine the 
consequences of their policy actions. 
  
7. Intended Consequences 
 
As noted, the primary intended consequence of 
VAM use is to improve teaching and help teachers (and 
schools/districts) become better at educating students by 
measuring and then holding teachers accountable for 
their effects on students. The stronger the consequences, 
the stronger the motivation leading to stronger intended 
effects. Secondary intended consequences include 
                                               
74 Position Statement on High-Stakes Testing in Pre-K–12 
Education, AM. EDUC. RES. ASS’N (2000), http://www.aera. 
net/About-AERA/AERA-Rules-Policies/Association-Policies/ 
Position-Statement-on-High-Stakes-Testing [https://perma.cc/ 
969R-8RMR]; see also STANDARDS, supra note 41.   
75 Arguably, some “reformers” assume that their ideas are 
inviolable and opposition is simply a reflection of a recalcitrant 
system, at best, or teachers’ unions at worst. See e.g., Michelle 
Rhee, Opting Out of Standardized Tests? Wrong Answer, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/michelle-rhee-opting-out-of-standardized-tests-wrong-
answer/2014/04/04/37a6e6a8-b8f9-11e3-96ae-f2c36d2b1245_ 
story.html [https://perma.cc/JD5L-6APK] (suggesting that an 
organization she founded always keeps students’ interests first 
and also implying that teachers’ unions do not, especially in 
regards to the use of standardized tests).  
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replacing the nation’s antiquated teacher evaluation 
systems which have been criticized by all corners of the 
education research.76  
Yet, in practice, research evidence supporting 
whether VAM use has led to these intended consequences 
is suspect. Indeed, numerous studies have noted that 
there is a lack of evidence linking VAMs to improved 
teacher quality. First, VAM estimates have not produced 
useable information for teachers about how teachers, 
schools, and states might improve upon their instruction, 
or how all involved might collectively improve student 
learning and achievement over time.77 Likewise, recent 
evidence suggests the use of VAMs has not led to 
improvements in teacher evaluation systems.78 In sum, 
strong evidence suggest that VAMs have not promoted 
the intended benefits of providing actionable information 
for teachers to improve instruction or teacher evaluation 
systems. 
 
8. Unintended Consequences 
 
Simultaneously, ethical and research standards 
require that the use of testing data must also recognize 
VAMs’ unintended consequences.79 Policymakers must 
present evidence on whether VAMs cause unintended 
effects and if those effects outweigh their intended 
impact. This means that the educative goals at issue (e.g., 
increased student learning and achievement) should be 
                                               
76  See, e.g., DANIEL WEISBERG ET AL., THE WIDGET EFFECT 
(2009) (criticizing the evaluation models that treat teachers as 
“widgets” and fail to recognize their differences and value). 
77 Henry Braun, The Value in Value-Added Depends on the 
Ecology, 44 EDUC. RES. 2 (2015); Corcoran, supra note 12. 
78 Matthew A. Kraft & Allison Gilmour, Revisiting the Widget 
Effect: Teacher Evaluation Reforms and the Distribution of 
Teacher Effectiveness, 46 EDUC. RES. 234–49 (2017). 
79 See AM. EDUC. RES. ASS’N, supra note 74; STANDARDS, supra 
note 41. 
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examined alongside the positive and negative 
implications for both the science and ethics of using 
VAMs in practice.80  
Researchers have produced an exhaustive list of 
these unintended consequences.81 First, the use of VAMs 
leads to teacher isolation whereby teachers “literally or 
figuratively ‘close their classroom door’ and revert to 
working alone.”82 Sadly, teacher isolation is at cross-
purposes with collaboration among colleagues, 
something that is an essential part to improving 
schools.83 Second, the use of high-stakes testing causes 
teachers to leave the profession and avoid high-needs 
schools that most need the best teachers.84 Because of the 
very nature of VAM-based teacher evaluation which 
rewards testing achievement, teachers avoid teaching 
high-needs students. This is rational: if they perceive 
themselves to be at greater risk of teaching students who 
may be more likely to hinder their value-added85 they 
“seek safer [grade level, subject area, classroom, or 
school] assignments, where they can avoid the risk of low 
VAMS scores.”86 Of course, the flip side of this, teachers 
avoid challenging assignments or leave the profession all 
together.87 Third, and most troubling perhaps, is the 
dehumanization that high-stakes testing causes. Indeed, 
under such regimes, teachers view and react to students 
as “potential score increasers or score compressors,” not 
children.88 
 
                                               
80  Messick, supra note 47.  
81  See, e.g., Susan Moore Johnson, Will VAMS Reinforce the 
Walls of the Egg-Crate School?, 44 EDUC. RES. 117–26 (2015).  




86 Id.  
87 Id. 
88 Hewitt, supra note 61, at 32.  
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III. The Cases 
 
This section discusses cases where the central 
issue was the role VAMs played in adverse employment 
actions. It first traces those cases related to arguments 
grounded in the substantive Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution. It then 
highlights the series of cases where plaintiffs challenged 
the use of VAMs on jurisdictional grounds (i.e., that a 
particular government agency superseded its authority 
or other statutes in requiring the use of VAMs). The final 
subsection assesses the cases where process arguments 
have been advanced by the plaintiffs.  
 
A. Federal Substantive Due Process Rights & 
Equal Protection Arguments: VAMs May Be 
Unwise But Still Constitutional 
   
1. Cook v. Bennett  
 
 In 2015, a group of teachers challenged Florida’s 
use of student test scores to evaluate their job 
performance.89 As part of that state’s application for Race 
to the Top funds, the state legislature enacted a new 
teacher performance evaluation regimen in their law of 
teacher evaluation.90 Specifically, the legislature 
required that at least 50% of a teacher’s performance 
evaluation be based on student growth on state 
standardized tests in math and English (the Florida 
Comprehensive Assessment Test, or FCAT).91 The 
remaining portion of the teacher’s evaluation was 
                                               
89 Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015). 
90 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.34 (West 2011). 
91 Id. A teacher’s final evaluation was based on the student test 
growth (the VAM rating) on the FCAT (50%) and a VAM rating 
based on the school’s contribution to a student’s growth. Cook, 
792 F.3d at 1297. 
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calculated based on a school-wide VAM rating.92 Not all 
students take the math and English tests. In fact, 
students took the English FCAT exam in grades 3 
through 10 and the mathematics FCAT exam in grades 3 
through 8.  
 Under the evaluation law, Florida teachers fell 
under one of three types of categories.93 “Type A” teachers 
were those that taught the tested subjects (math and 
English) in the years that the FCAT was administered 
for those subjects. In effect, as the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals noted, the model adopted by the state 
education commissioner only worked as designed in 
evaluating teachers of English in grades 4 through 10 
and math in grades 4 through 8.94 The rest of Florida’s 
public school teachers fell into two groups. “Type B” 
teachers taught students in grades 4 through 10, but in 
subjects other than English or math.95 “Type C” teachers 
taught students in grades below 4 or above 10 or their 
students did not take standardized tests (e.g., art).96  
 The thrust of the legal problem, according to the 
teachers challenging the evaluation scheme, related to 
the evaluation of Type B and C teachers. As a practical 
matter, school districts evaluated Type B teachers using 
student FCAT scores for math and English, 
notwithstanding the fact that those teachers did not 
instruct the students in those subjects.97 Type C teachers’ 
VAM scores were calculated based on school-wide FCAT 
scores derived from student scores in subjects they did 
not teach.98 Under this scenario, for example, a second 
                                               
92 Id.  
93 The district court designated the classification set forth in 
this discussion and, for ease of reference, the appeals court 
adopted it in its analysis.  




98 Id. at 1298. 
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grade art teacher’s VAM rating could be calculated based 
on a 3rd grade student’s math and English test growth.  
 The plaintiff-teachers argued that the evaluation 
laws violated the Substantive Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.99 
Because no fundamental right was at issue, the court 
applied the rational basis test to determine whether the 
government’s actions had a legitimate purpose and 
whether the chosen methods were rationally related to 
that purpose.100 Ultimately, the court sided with the 
government, finding that there was a legitimate interest 
which was to “increas[e] student academic performance 
by improving the quality of instructional, administrative, 
and supervisory services in the public schools of the 
state.”101  
The court also concluded that there was a rational 
relationship between this purpose and the use of the 
FCAT VAMs.102 The court concluded—and the plaintiffs 
conceded at oral argument—that the government “could 
have reasonably believed that (1) a teacher can improve 
student performance through his or her presence in a 
                                               
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides, in relevant part, that: “No 
state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
100 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1300 (citing Fresenius Med. Care 
Holdings, Inc. v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 935, 945 (11th Cir. 2013); 
FCC v. Beach Comm’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 n.6 (1993)).   
101 Id. at 1301 (citing FLA. STAT. § 1012.34(1)(a) (2013)); see also 
Houston Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1182 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (concluding 
that plaintiff’s substantive due process claims failed because 
“[e]ven accepting plaintiffs’ criticisms at face value, the loose 
constitutional standard of rationality allows governments to 
use blunt tools which may produce only marginal results.”). 
The Houston court, however, ruled that the plaintiff’s 
allegations of procedural due process violations survived 
summary judgment dismissal. Id. at 1183.  
102 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1301. 
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school and (2) the FCAT VAM can measure those school-
wide performance improvements, even if the model was 
not designed to do so.”103 To be sure, both the appellate 
and district courts criticized the chosen model.104 
The court similarly applied the rational basis 
review to dismiss the equal protection claims.105 Under 
this claim, the teachers argued that the evaluation law 
created a separate class of teachers: “those whose 
evaluations are based on student growth data for 
students assigned to the teacher in the subjects taught 
by the teacher, and those whose evaluations are based on 
student growth data for students and/or subjects they do 
not teach.”106 However, because this classification did not 
implicate a suspect class (e.g., race, gender) rational basis 
applied and, under the same line of reasoning of the 




                                               
103 Id.   
104 Id. at 1301 (noting that “[w]hile the FCAT VAM may not be 
the best method—or may even be a poor one—for achieving this 
goal, it is still rational to think that the challenged evaluation 
procedures would advance the government's stated purpose.”). 
The district court in finding for the government concluded, in 
dicta, that “[t]he unfairness of the evaluation system as 
implemented is not lost on this Court” and that “this Court 
would be hard-pressed to find anyone who would find this 
evaluation system fair to non-FCAT teachers, let alone be 
willing to submit to a similar evaluation system.” Cook v. 
Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1215–16 (N.D. Fla. 2014), aff’d 
sub nom. Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015).  
105 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1301. 
106 Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1213. 
107 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1301 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (internal citations 
omitted)).  
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2. Trout v. Knox County Board of Education 
 
 Plaintiff teachers in Trout v. Knox County Board 
of Education brought substantive and procedural due 
process claims based on their evaluations that used 
VAMs for purposes of teacher evaluations.108 In Trout, 
the teachers challenged the use of Tennessee’s VAM 
rating (the EVAAS). Specifically, two teachers (one a 
math teacher and the other a science teacher) were 
denied bonuses based on their VAM rating.109 
 Both teachers involved (Trout and Taylor, 
respectively) argued that the use of the VAMs was 
arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, could not be 
sustained under the rational basis test. Echoing 
criticisms of the reliability and validity of VAMs,110 the 
plaintiffs argued that the VAMs were too imprecise to be 
used to assess their effectiveness111 and therefore 
violated substantive due process rights. 
 The federal district court ruled in favor of the 
government. It began its analysis by noting that the 
plaintiffs failed to state a substantive due process 
claim.112 By way of background, a substantive due 
process claim requires that there be some property 
interest at stake. Here, under an analysis of property 
interest rights in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have an 
interest in bonuses.113 
 For sake of argument, however, the court went on 
to apply the rational test and found that the 
government’s use of the VAMs in this case satisfied that 
                                               
108 Trout v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., 163 F. Supp. 3d 492, 494 
(E.D. Tenn. 2016). 
109 Id.   
110 See supra Part I. 
111 Trout, 163 F.Supp. 3d at 500. 
112 Id.  
113 Id at 501. 
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test.114 The use of VAMs to identify and support 
instruction to lead to increased student achievement was 
not in dispute as a legitimate government interest.115 The 
plaintiffs, similar to Cook v. Bennett,116 argued that 
various statistical infirmities made reliance on VAMs 
irrational, however.117 In rejecting these arguments, the 
district court noted, among other things, that there was 
no legal authority requiring the court to apply a standard 
with respect to the confidence level of a test.118  
 To be sure, the Trout court was sympathetic to the 
plaintiffs’ complaints regarding the statistical 
inadequacy of the VAMs.119 Yet, at bottom, there was no 
legal authority that required the court to apply a certain 
level of statistical confidence with respect to the 




                                               
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 503. 
116 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1297.  
117 For example, the plaintiffs took issue with the confidence 
level of the statistical test (68%). Trout, 163 F.Supp. 3d at 503. 
118 Id.  
119 Id. at 504 (writing that the Court notes that Plaintiffs' 
criticisms of the statistical methods of TVAAS are not 
unfounded.)               
120 Id. at 504–05. The court wrote that while “[p]laintiffs 
bemoan the statistical imprecision of TVAAS,” no legal 
authority “support[s] the proposition that the United States 
Constitution requires legislative decision making regarding 
the use of statistics to require ‘statistically significant’ results. 
Absent controlling authority to the contrary, this Court refuses 
to extend the rational basis test this far—where no suspect 
class or fundamental right is at issue, the Constitution 
requires a rational basis, not a statistically significant basis, 
for the law in question.” Id.  
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3. Wagner v. Haslam 
 
 Another set of teachers in Tennessee challenged 
the use of VAMs in Wagner v. Haslam.121 Pursuant to 
state and district evaluation policies, teachers of non-
tested subjects were evaluated based on school wide data 
of student performance on test subjects.122 Similar to 
Cook v. Bennett, the teachers claimed that this practice 
violated the substantive Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution.123 
 The federal court, however, echoing the decisions 
of other federal courts assessing similar claims, rejected 
the teachers’ arguments. With respect to the substantive 
due process claim, the court enumerated several reasons 
why the policies at issue passed constitutional muster. It 
noted that “the State Board could rationally believe that 
a school-wide score provides some measure (albeit a crude 
one) of evaluating an individual teacher’s 
performance.”124 The court also added that the legislature 
had continued to amend its teacher evaluation laws to 
address some of the concerns raised by the plaintiffs.125  
While the Wagner court concluded that the use of 
VAMs was constitutional, it expressed concerns over 
fairness similar to those found in Cook and Trout. Indeed, 
the Wagner court wrote that although the current 
evaluation processes may produce “unfair results” for 
certain teachers, it did not rise to the level of being 
irrational.126 At the same time, the court was explicit 
about its use of judicial restraint, especially with respect 
to education policy questions. Indeed, subject to limited 
                                               
121 112 F. Supp. 3d 673 (M.D. Tenn. 2015).                   
122 Id.  
123 See Cook, 792 F.3d at 1297. 
124 Wagner, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 694 (emphasis added). 
125 Id.  
126 Id. at 695. 
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exceptions,127 the states have “unfettered”128 discretion to 
regulate education, and state legislators can make both 
“excellent decisions and terrible decisions,” so long as 
there is some “modicum of rationality.”129 Put another 
way, a court may disagree with the policy choice of a 
governing body, but it is not the role of the courts to 
second-guess policy judgments of elected officials.130 
 
4. Matter of Lederman v. King  
 
 The one extant case that succeeded in 
demonstrating the government’s use of VAMs rose to the 
high bar of arbitrary and capricious is found in Matter of 
Lederman v. King.131 In this case, a well-regarded 
veteran teacher who had previously had positive 
evaluations received an “ineffective” review under New 
York’s new evaluation system.132 This new system 
required the use of VAMs. The teacher, Sheryl 
Lederman, submitted “overwhelming” and ample 
evidence from experts in the field that the court 
concluded satisfied her burden in the record before the 
court.133 
 In contrast, the court noted that state defendants 
left numerous statistical issues unaddressed, including 
the potential VAM biases against teachers with high-
                                               
127 Some exceptions, of course, would include the use of race to 
segregate schools. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 
483 (1954).  
128 Id. at 692. 
129 Id. at 693. 
130 But see PAIGE, supra note 9 (arguing that for scholars of 
educational policy the appropriate question is determining 
which institutions—courts, legislatures, or markets—have the 
capacity to best address a particular policy need in education, 
like teacher evaluation). 
131 Lederman v. King, 54 Misc. 3d 886 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016).       
132 Id. at 888.  
133 Id. at 897–98. 
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performing students.134Critically, how Mrs. Lederman’s 
scores swung so wildly from the second-highest level of 
effective all the way to the lowest level of ineffective in a 
single year with statistically similar scoring students, 
among others.135 In sum, the court was constrained to the 
record before it and, on that evidence, found Ms. 
Lederman satisfied her burden.136                 
 
B. Legislative State Agency Authority 
Questioned 
 
 Litigants have also challenged the use of VAMs in 
teacher evaluation on jurisdictional grounds. In these 
cases, organizations (typically unions) have argued that 
a legislative or executive agency exceeded their 
respective authority in requiring VAMs for purposes of 
evaluation or high-stakes employment decisions. These 
cases are discussed below. 
 
1. Leff v. Clark County School District 
 
 At issue in Leff v. Clark County School District 
was the constitutionality of changes made to state laws 
governing teacher evaluation and post-probationary (or 
continuing contract) status.137 By way of background, up 
until 2011, a teacher who completed a probationary 
period of employment (three years) and was subsequently 
rehired by a school district received post-probationary 
status.138  Post-probationary status conferred to a teacher 
certain procedural protections should they face 
termination and required that termination be “for 
                                               
134 Id. 
135 Id.  
136 Id. at 898. 
137 Leff v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 210 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1244–
45 (D. Nev. 2016). 
138 Id. at 1245. 
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cause.”139 In contrast, probationary teachers could be 
non-renewed without cause and did not have similar 
procedural protections.  
 In 2011, the Nevada legislature changed its 
teacher evaluation and post-probationary statutes. In 
particular, it required that VAMs be used as part of 
teacher evaluations. The legislature also required that if 
a post-probationary teacher achieved two negative 
evaluations, they would revert back to probationary 
teacher status.140 Put another way, a teacher could lose 
the protections (e.g., a teacher’s termination could only 
be for “cause”) because of the changes to the state 
statutes. 
 Teachers contested the changes based on the 
federal Constitution’s Contracts Clause.141 That clause, 
in relevant part, reads as follows:  “No State shall . . . 
pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts[.]”142 In essence, the post-probationary 
teachers claimed that they had a binding contract with 
the state once they achieved post-probationary status.  In 
exchange for meeting the demands of satisfactory 
performance, the state had agreed to give them 
procedural protections and the only grounds for 
termination were cause. By passing the 2011 amendment 
that tied teacher contract status to teacher evaluations 
(that incorporated VAMs), the state breached the 
contract, something not permitted under the U.S. 
Constitution. 
 The federal court declined to adopt the teachers’ 
position and held that the statute prior to 2011 did not 
create a contractual obligation between the state and 
teachers. In its analysis, the court determined that there 
is a strong presumption in law against the idea that a 
                                               
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 1244. 
142 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
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legislative action creates a private contract.143 Absent 
any expression of the legislature that they were creating 
a contract, it is generally assumed that typical legislative 
activity simply reflects a policy determination that can be 
changed.144 Accordingly, the teachers’ claim that the 
state legislature exceeded its authority with the 
statutory amendments failed. 
 
2. Stapleton v. Skandera 
 
 In Stapleton v. Skandera, teachers challenged the 
use of VAMs in teacher evaluation on several 
jurisdictional grounds related to statutory and agency 
authority.145 By way of brief background, the New Mexico 
legislature attempted—but failed—to make several 
amendments to its existing teacher evaluation laws in 
2012. Notwithstanding this, the New Mexico Department 
of Education Secretary (through the Department) 
promulgated new regulations relative to the evaluation 
of teachers.146 The teachers sought judicial relief in that 
the court would suspend the use of the regulations.147 
 The teachers argued that the Secretary exceeded 
her authority—that, in effect, she acted in a legislative 
capacity. They raised particular objection to the 
incorporation of VAMs in teacher evaluation, arguing 
that such a move could only be done by way of legislative 
action because it represented a shift in public policy 
under exclusive legislative purview.148 However, the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals sided with the Department on 
                                               
143 Leff, 210 F. Supp. 3d at 1246–47 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp. v. Atchinson Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 
465–66.) 
144 Id. 
145 Stapleton v. Skandera, 346 P.3d 1191, 1194 (N.M. App. 
2015). 
146 Id. at 1193 (citing N.M. CODE R. § 6.69.8). 
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 1194. 
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this issue. It noted that the enabling statute required 
only that the Department enact evaluation regulations 
that were “uniform statewide” and “highly objective.”149 
Accordingly, the legislature left the Secretary “broad 
authority” to enact regulations reflecting these 
requirements and, in the view of the court, including 
VAMs in teacher evaluation protocol did not exceed her 
authority.150 
 The teachers in Stapleton raised other claims 
related to agency authority. In particular, they raised two 
additional objections. They contended the new 
departmental regulations permitted “assistant 
principals” to observe teachers which violated the state 
evaluation law that only gave such authority to 
“principals.”151 Similarly, they argued that the provisions 
in the regulations that exempted charter schools from 
coverage of the evaluations violated the state law 
requirement that the Department enact a system of 
“uniform” evaluation.152 
 The court of appeals rejected both of the 
arguments. With respect to the first claim (that only 
principals could observe teachers), the court read the 
state statute as allowing others to observe teachers, 
including assistant principals. The court wrote, “We 
agree with the district court that the regulation does not 
necessarily conflict with the statute because the statute 
‘mandates the participation of school principals [but] 
does not limit the persons who may [also] observe 
[teachers].’”153  Regarding the claim that the regulations 
inappropriately exempted charter schools, the state court 
of appeals noted that the state Charter School Act 
specifically allowed the Department to waive certain 
                                               
149 Id. at 1195 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10A-19(A) (1978)). 
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 1196. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. (alterations in original). 
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regulations normally applicable to public schools.154  
Because the teachers could not cite to any other legal 
authority that suggested the waiver was not permitted 
under the Charter School Act, this theory was also 
rejected.155 
 
3. Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. State 
 
In Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. State, a 
teacher’s union challenged Louisiana’s enactment, 
amendment, and repeal of multiple state laws related to 
public education, including those related to teacher 
evaluation requirements.156 During the 2012 legislative 
sessions, the state legislature amended and re-enacted 
nine different statutes, enacted two new distinct 
statutes, and repealed twenty-eight statutes all related 
to education.157  
The plaintiffs alleged that these actions, which all 
occurred through one legislative act, violated the state 
constitution’s “single object” requirement.158 That 
requirement stipulates that the legislature enacts bills 
that have “one object” and that various pieces of a bill 
must have a relationship to one another.159 The teachers 
argued that the bill contained unrelated subjects, such as 
the changes to teacher evaluation, reduction in force 
issues, rules governing contracts with superintendents, 
among others.160  
Louisiana’s supreme court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
arguments.161 The court began its assessment by noting 
                                               
154 Id.  
155 Id. at 1196–97. 
156 La. Fed’n of Teachers v. State, 171 So. 3d 835, 841 (La. 
2014). 
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 838. 
159 Id. at 841.  
160 Id. at 842. 
161 Id. at 851. 
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that there is a general presumption that a legislature’s 
acts satisfy the “one object” rule.162 It also noted that the 
purpose of the rule was to prevent “logrolling,” or the 
practice of packaging many measures into one bill 
because any of those measures, alone, would not pass the 
legislature.163 The court noted that under such a “grave 
and palpable” scenario, the legislature would violate the 
single object rule.164 Yet, in this case, the court concluded 
that the object of the act at issue “is improving 
elementary and secondary education through tenure 
reform and performance standards based on 
effectiveness.”165 The court concluded that various 
components of that bill could be broadly related to this 
objective.166 
 
4. Robinson v. Stewart  
 
Another Florida case, Robinson v. Stewart,167 also 
involved a challenge to the authority of the state Board 
of Education to implement teacher evaluation 
regulations using VAMs.168 In Robinson, the plaintiffs 
sought to declare the 2011 Student Success Act 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it impermissibly 
delegated legislative control over public education to the 
executive branch.169 The act revised teacher evaluation 
procedures and required the use of “student learning 
growth measures” (or VAMs) to evaluate teachers and 
make significant employment decisions, such as 
tenure.170 The act left it to the Department of Education 
                                               
162 Id. at 845. 
163 Id. at 845–46. 
164 Id. at 851. 
165 Id. at 850. 
166 Id.  
167 161 So. 3d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
168Id.at 590–91. 
169 Id.  
170 Id. at 591.  
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Commissioner (the executive branch) to develop the 
formula to achieve these goals171 and required the use of 
standardized test scores.172 
The Florida District Court of Appeals rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument that the legislature, in requiring the 
Commissioner to develop the formula, violated the non-
delagability doctrine of the state constitution that 
ensures a separation of powers.173 Its analysis noted that 
the plaintiffs carried a high burden of proof: that the 
legislature’s action violated the doctrine “beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” the highest standard of proof under 
the law.174 The court further interpreted the act as simply 
requiring the Commissioner to provide technical 
implementation support, as opposed to allowing the 
executive to make policy determinations.175  
 
5. Filed but not Adjudicated  
 
Another case that deserves some attention as it 
also related to a claim that a state agency exceeded its 
authority by incorporating VAMs in evaluating teachers. 
In Texas Teachers Association v. Texas Education Agency, 
the Texas Department of Education adopted teacher 
                                               
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 592.  
173 Id. at 590–91. 
174 Id. at 591.  
175 Id. at 592.  But see id. at 597 (Benton, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the legislature “has conferred on the State Board of 
Education power to designate some of them—perhaps nearly 
all of them—professionally ‘unsatisfactory,’ and therefore, 
among other things, subject to being laid off, for reasons that 
are so unclear and indefinite that the Legislature has 
abandoned its responsibility to set public policy in this 
important area, and delegated legislative authority it should 
have exercised itself to the State Board of Education, an 
executive branch agency.”) 
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evaluation regulations requiring the use of VAMs.176 
Numerous plaintiffs, including teachers’ unions, sought 
to enjoin the use of VAMs on the grounds that the 
regulations exceeded the power vested in the state 
Department of Education.177 The case settled and the 
state ultimately agreed to eliminate the required use of 
VAMs in teacher evaluation regulations.178 
In New Mexico ex rel Stewart v. New Mexico 
Public Education Department, a group of plaintiffs 
consisting of legislators, unions, and teachers filed a 
complaint on the grounds that the state Department of 
Education improperly infringed other state laws when it 
promulgated its teacher evaluation regulations.179 
Plaintiffs argued that the School Personnel Act provides 
for the processes associated with teacher evaluation and 
termination.180  
Similarly, plaintiffs allege that the Department’s 
regulation conflicts with New Mexico’s Public 
                                               
176 Sean Collins Walsh, Union Sues to Block Texas Teacher 




177 Id.  
178 Melissa B. Taboada, Lawsuit Settled: Texas Teacher 
Appraisals Won’t Be Tied to STAAR Scores, AUSTIN AM.-




179 Complaint, State ex rel Stewart v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, 
No. D-101-CV-2015-00409 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Feb. 13, 2015), 
https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/nm-complaint-
teacherevals_1114.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T99-FG89]. The 
plaintiffs also claim substantive and procedural due process 
violations.  
180 See e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10A-19(D) (2010) (providing 
that evaluations should be determined in part by how well 
professional development was carried out).  
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Employment Bargaining Law (the state’s enabling 
collective bargaining statute) that governs “the terms 
and conditions of employment.”181 More specifically, that 
law provides that local school districts must negotiate 
terms and conditions of employment with the 
representative union.182 The case is pending with various 
motions before the court.183 
 
C. Process & “Fundamental Fairness” Cases 
 
1. Houston Federation of Teachers 
 
 A group of Houston teachers sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief in the case of Houston Federation of 
Teachers v. Houston Independent School District.184 At 
issue for the court was the constitutional protections 
afforded teachers in the instance where the Houston 
public school districts used VAMs to rate and make 
employment decisions for its teachers.185 The Houston 
Independent School District (HISD) had contracted with 
a third-party vendor who had created certain algorithms 
to classify and rate teachers based on their students’ test 
performance.186  This third party vendor, citing trade 
secrecy, refused to reveal the algorithms when they were 
requested for review by the teachers.187 Therefore, 
teachers who faced adverse employment consequences 
                                               
181 Complaint at 31, Stewart, No. D-101-CV-2015-00409. 
182 See generally N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-17 (New Mexico’s 
Public Employment Labor Relations Statute).  
183 See Motion for Summary Judgment Filed in New Mexico 
Teacher Evaluation Lawsuit, (Feb. 13, 2018), http://www. 
krwg.org/post/motion-summary-judgment-filed-new-mexico-
teacher-evaluation-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/R8CU-DYHN].  
184 Houston Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1174 (S.D. Tex. 2017).  
185 Id. at 1171. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 1172. 
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could not review the underlying formulas that 
contributed to these decisions.188 
 The teachers claimed that the use of the value 
added models constituted violation of the substantive and 
procedural due process clauses of the Constitution.189 
Repeating a line of reasoning in Cook v. Bennett, and 
other cases, the federal district court ruled that the 
district’s use of VAMs did not amount to a substantive 
due process violation.190 The court concluded the 
following: “Even accepting plaintiffs’ criticisms at face 
value, the loose constitutional standard of rationality 
allows governments to use blunt tools which may produce 
only marginal results. HISD’s motion for summary 
judgment on this substantive due process claim is 
granted.”191  
 Yet the court found in favor of the plaintiffs’ 
procedural due process claims.192 The court’s analysis is 
instructive because it relied heavily on procedural due 
process as ensuring fundamental fairness.193 The court 
wrote:   
 
“[The] purpose of procedural due process is to 
convey to the individual a feeling that the 
government has dealt with him fairly, as well as 
to minimize the risk of mistaken deprivations of 
protected interests.” [] In short, due process is 
designed to foster government decision-making 
that is both fair and accurate.194 
 
                                               
188 Id. at 1172–73. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 1181–82. 
191 Id. at 1182.  
192 Id. at 1180.  
193 Id.   
194 Id. at 1176 (alteration in original) (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 
435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978)). 
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The court then listed the factors required for procedural 
due process to be satisfied in the case of a teacher 
termination in Texas.195 Of particular note was that a 
teacher facing termination must “be advised of the cause 
for his termination in sufficient detail so as to enable him 
to show any error that may exist.”196  
 Teachers contended—and the court agreed—that 
they were not being afforded due process protections 
because the school district violated the requirement that 
afforded a teacher “sufficient detail” to show that there 
may be an error in the government’s decision.197 Because 
the district’s third party vendor would not release the 
underlying formulas, teachers could not possibly assess 
the accuracy of the district’s value-added rating.198 
 The court listed numerous potential errors that 
could be revealed if inspection of the formulas was 
permitted.199 As the court stated: “The [] score “might be 
erroneously calculated for any number of reasons, 
ranging from data-entry mistakes to glitches in the 
computer code itself. . . . HISD has acknowledged that 
mistakes can occur in calculating a teacher’s EVAAS 
score . . . .”200 The court was troubled by the district’s 
stipulation that it could not correct a single teacher’s 
score, even if an error was found, because correcting one 
score would alter the results of all other teachers.201  
                                               
195 Id. 
196 Id. The court also noted that a teacher facing termination 
must be afforded: “the names and testimony of the witnesses 
against him; [] a meaningful opportunity to be heard in his own 
defense within a reasonable time; [] and a hearing before a 
tribunal that possesses some academic expertise and an 
apparent impartiality toward the charges.” Id. (citing Ferguson 
v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970).  
197 Id. at 1176–77 (citing Levitt v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 759 
F.2d 1224, 1228 (5th Cir. 1985)).  
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 1177. 
200 Id.  
201 Id. at 1178.  
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Indeed, it is worth recalling that value added 
scores are comparative in nature, assessing one teacher 
against others.202  This means that, if one teacher’s score 
is adjusted for an error, it alters all others.203 The court 
characterized the underlying foundation of the VAM 
ratings as built upon a “house of cards.”204 Accordingly, it 
denied the school district’s summary judgment claim 
with respect to procedural due process.205 
 
2. Washington Teachers’ Union v. D.C. Public 
Schools 
 
 The collective bargaining forum has also been 
another forum wherein teachers have successfully 
appealed the use of VAMs in teacher evaluations. By way 
of background, collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) 
provide for a process (grievance arbitration), to redress 
violations of the contract. This arbitration process can be 
important, especially when a contract calls for certain 
specifications concerning how teacher evaluations can be 
conducted. Indeed, districts’ decisions to non-renew or 
terminate a teacher for performance have been called 
into question because a district fails to follow 
contractually mandated processes.206 With some limited 
                                               
202 Id. at 1172. 
203 Id. at 1177. 
204 Id. at 1178.  
205 Id. at 1180. To be sure, procedural due process claims made 
in Wagner v. Haslam, see supra notes 121129 and 
accompanying discussion, did not survive. However, at issue in 
that case was whether the teachers' bonuses could be linked to 
their VAM scores. Wagner v. Haslam, 112 F. Supp. 3d 673, 688 
(M.D. Tenn. 2015). In that context, the court concluded that 
bonuses were not a property interest sufficient to trigger due 
process protections. Id. at 698.   
206 See, e.g., Dennis Yarmouth Teachers v. Dennis Yarmouth 
Reg’l Sch. Dist, 360 N.E.3d 883, 884–885 (1977) (reversing a 
school district’s decision to non-renew a probationary teacher 
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exceptions, scholarship has omitted consideration of the 
value and importance of collective bargaining 
agreements in relation to legal challenges to the use of 
VAMs in teacher evaluations.207 
 Cases emerging from Washington, D.C., illustrate 
this theme. In Washington, a teacher’s union grieved the 
public district’s performance ratings based on VAMs of 
hundreds of teachers. As an initial matter, the school 
district challenged whether the issue could, in fact, be 
subject to the grievance arbitration procedures in the 
contract. Indeed, as a general matter, disputes are 
subject to the grievance process only if both parties 
agreed to arbitrate the dispute under the CBA.208  
In Washington Teachers’ Union, a lower court had 
concluded that the district’s final evaluation decisions 
made under the evaluation systems were not arbitrable 
but the district’s use of evaluation procedures under the 
collective bargaining was, in fact, arbitrable.209 Put 
another way, the parties did not, under the CBA, agree 
to arbitrate disputes over the judgment of the teachers’ 
final performance, but they did agree to arbitrate 
whether or not the evaluation procedures outlined were 
                                               
because school district violated terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement that specified evaluation processes).  
207 But see PAIGE, supra note 9, at 63–73 (arguing the use of 
VAMs is susceptible to the grievance arbitration process and 
the failures of VAMs to accurately assess teacher effectiveness 
could be remedied through the collective bargaining process.); 
see also Mark A. Paige, Applying the Paradox Theory: A Law 
and Policy Analysis of Collective Bargaining Rights and 
Teacher Evaluation Reform From Selected States, 2013 BYU 
EDUC. & L.J. 21, 41–42 (highlighting the benefits of a more 
collaborative collective bargaining process understood as 
“interest-based” bargaining particularly with respect to 
teacher evaluation). 
208  Wash. Teachers’ Union v. D.C. Pub. Schs., 77 A.3d 441 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) 
209 Id. at 444. 
139
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2 
 
[568] 
followed.210 On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals upheld the decision that the district’s final 
judgments were not arbitrable. However, the school 
district did not challenge the lower court’s determination 
that the issue of whether the district followed evaluation 
procedures was subject to evaluation.211  
In at least one other well-publicized case, the 
Washington Teachers’ Union succeeded in frustrating 
the D.C. Public Schools use of the IMPACT evaluation 
system.212 In this case, the union alleged that the school 
district violated various evaluation procedures when they 
terminated a seventeen year veteran teacher, Thomas 
O’Rourke, under the district’s evaluation procedures.213 
As noted above, the controlling courts in the District of 
Columbia have concluded that “process arguments” 
under the collective bargaining agreement are arbitrable, 
although the school district’s final judgment with respect 
to evaluation categorization (e.g., ineffective, 
satisfactory, etc.) is not. 
In the District of Columbia Public Schools matter, 
the arbitrator found that the district violated evaluation 
procedures governing the length of observation visits, 
which, according to the contract, should be “at least 30 
minutes.”214 In this case, the administrators evaluating 
the teacher exceeded that length by substantial amounts 
(e.g., observations lasted 80 minutes), which, in the eyes 
of the arbitrator, amounted to a procedural violation of 
evaluation processes.215 Importantly, the arbitrator noted 
                                               
210 Id.  
211 Id.  
212  D.C. Pub. Sch. v. Wash. Teachers Union, Local 6, AAA No. 
16-20-1300-0499 AVH (Feigenbaum, Arb.); see also Perry 
Stein, Teachers Union Touts Victory in Evaluation Fight WASH. 
POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
education/wp/2016/04/05/teachers-union-touts-victory-in-
evaluation-fight/ [https://perma.cc/P7RU-PSP7].  
213 D.C. Pub. Schs., AAA No. 16-20-1300-0499 AVH. 
214 Id. at 26–28.  
215 Id. at 18. 
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two other significant factual findings to his decision. He 
concluded that the administrator evaluating the teacher 
had a reputation of using the observation system to 
penalize teachers “he did not like.”216 A school district 
administrator, as well, testified that an observation that 
exceeded or did not meet the thirty minute threshold 
would amount to a process violation.217 In sum, and under 
these circumstances, therefore, procedural violations 
could be seen as simply pretext for terminating a 
teacher.218 
In arbitration cases, the remedy for a bargaining 
violation can be a contested issue. In Washington, D.C., 
an arbitrator cannot issue a remedy in the form of 
recategorizing a teacher’s evaluation from ineffective to 
effective.219 Reinstatement and back pay, however, are 
typical arbitration remedies,220 and these were, in fact, 
used in the case. 
 
IV. Current Policy Landscape in Wake of ESSA 
 
This section discusses the current policy 
landscape following the reauthorization of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 by 
Congressional passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act 
(ESSA) of 2015. It illustrates that the ESSA 
reauthorization allowed for more state-level flexibility 
with regards to VAM use. It then highlights how the new 
policies have essentially shifted the emphasis from VAMs 
                                               
216 Id. at 19. 
217 Id. at 7.  
218 Id. at 19.  
219 Wash. Teachers’ Union v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 77 A.3d 441, 458 
(D.C. Cir. 2013). 
220 See e.g., DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION ch. 
13.I.A. (Norman Brand & Melissa Birens, eds., 3d ed.) (noting 
that back-pay and reinstatement are two essential remedies for 
making an employee whole).  
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in high stakes decision making to, perhaps, other ways of 
measurement.   
 
A. ESSA Reauthorization 
 
In 2015, Congress passed a reauthorization of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act under a new 
name, the Every Student Succeeds Act.221 In general, 
ESSA reduced some federal mandates and incentives tied 
to accountability system effectively limiting some of the 
federal control promoted by RttT and other waiver 
requirements.222 Specifically, ESSA allowed state 
departments of education two main changes: (a) ESSA 
gave state departments leniency to interpret key terms 
like, “including, as a significant factor, data on student 
growth for all students,” and (b) ESSA gave state 
departments more control to determine state goals and 
measures for success with a federal framework.223 Put 
simply, ESSA allowed more flexibility.  
To break down the policy changes further, the first 
main change, allowing states to interpret “data on 
student growth” differently, allowed state departments of 
education to step back from the statistically-based 
measures of student growth such as VAMs. ESSA 
allowed states to use some measures which could include 
qualitative measures as data showing student growth, 
such as student learning objectives (SLOs), which are 
objectives for the growth of students developed at the 
beginning of the year by teachers (sometimes in 
conjunction with others).224  
SLOs still rely on evidence which can still include 
VAM scores, but the evidence can also include course 
                                               
221 Every Students Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-95 § 
114 Stat. 1177 (2015).  
222 Race to the Top Act of 2011, S. Res. 844, 112th Cong. (2011).  
223 ESEA Flexibility, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (2012), 
https://www.ed.gov/esea/flexibility [https://perma.cc/95A7-FLFA]. 
224 CLOSE ET AL., supra note 35, at 18. 
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exams, performance demonstrations, and other types of 
evidence. In short, ESSA allowed states to incorporate 
more nuanced and qualitative measures of student 
growth without removing the requirement that states 
must use evidence of student growth. The distinction is 
small but significant. It signals a redefinition of “data” to 
include information beyond large standardized testing 
(although, importantly, it can still include these test 
scores).  
The second main change, allowing states to set 
their own goals and measures for success, marks a 
backing away from the strict adequate yearly progress 
(AYP) goals established by NCLB. Although states still 
must meet AYP for certain subgroups of students, the 
consequences and the interventions that must be 
imposed can be decided by the states themselves. 
Essentially, ESSA removes the punitive bite 
demonstrated previously by NCLB, the bite that 
encouraged many states to apply for waivers and adopt 
VAMs in the first place, and replaces it with flexibility. 
States choose their own bite now. The standards remain, 
but the consequence, the type of intervention required for 
a failure to meet AYP, is decided by state departments of 
education. 
These two changes, though small, rolled back 
some of the features that encouraged, or forced, states to 
use large standardized statewide systems that leaned on 
VAM results to measure teacher achievement.225 The 
new policy meant states did not need to create large-scale 
comparable data about teacher achievement. States no 
longer needed to structure their systems top-down and 
could allow for more bottom-up control, essentially 
handing more control to local educational authorities 
such as school districts. ESSA marked a shift of power. 
The federal government loosened reigns on state 
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departments of education, who, in turn, had the freedom 
to deviate from establishing one-size-fits-all teacher 
evaluation systems across their state, handing more of 
the power to make decisions to local educational 
authorities, such as districts.  
 
B. State Plans  
 
Though ESSA allowed for many of the changes 
stated above, it did not require or guarantee these 
changes. The work of exercising the flexibility was for the 
states, not the federal government. Hence, this section on 
state plans reveals how state teacher evaluation plans 
changed as a whole after the passage of ESSA through 
state legislative and regulatory action. The changes, as 
expected, trend toward less use of VAMs in high-stakes 
decision making, though the trend is somewhat muted. 
 In general, less states are currently using growth 
models or VAMs for teacher evaluation. The percentage 
dropped from 42% in 2014 to 30% in 2018.226 However, 
that percentage drop fails to highlight the magnitude of 
change. The study showing that the percentage 
decreased measured whether some states currently use 
or, importantly, endorse statewide use of VAMs. Some of 
these states endorse VAMs but allow for local educational 
authorities to avoid VAMs completely. For example, 
Maine, encourages the use of VAMs, but offers two 
models from which local education authorities can 
choose, one of which measures student growth with 
SLOs, not VAMs.227 In this case, VAMs play a role in the 
state’s teacher evaluation process, but, ultimately, the 
choice is made locally. This represents a major departure 
from the trend of heavy-handed state teacher evaluation 
systems before the passage of ESSA.  
 Additionally, some states have maintained their 
VAMs but use them in novel ways. North Carolina still 
                                               
226 CLOSE ET AL., supra note 35, at 12.  
227 Id. at 13.  
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uses a VAM, called EVAAS, which featured heavily in 
many of the lawsuits.228 However, the state does not use 
the results to make high-stakes decisions. Rather, North 
Carolina uses and reports the scores to foster 
professional development.229 In other words, the state 
does not shy from using VAM data as a part of their 
system, but they do shy from using VAMs for 
consequential decisions such as tenure decisions and 
others. 
 Additionally, and of note, recent state plans 
demonstrate increased focus on formative feedback 
practices compared to state plans collected in 2012, with 
31 of 51 education plans stating that their evaluation 
systems use formative data.230 This shift indicates a 
significant change in the stated values present in this 
new set of state documents. 
 
V. Conclusions  
 
Quite apart from what education scholars and 
policymakers believe with respect to the merits of added 
models, all would likely agree that their introduction has 
had significant consequences. Of course, there is 
widespread disagreement with respect to how these 
statistical models should be used. Teachers and unions 
seeking to block the use of VAMs in high-stakes 
employment decisions have sought judicial relief with 
mixed success. That said, while courts may uphold the 
use of VAMs under a rational basis test, they are suspect 
about the wisdom of using VAMs to make significant 
decisions with respect to teacher employment status.  
But that does not mean that VAMs should be 
relegated to the dustbin of educational policy history. 
They may have important contributions to improving 
teacher quality. They may be important “flags” for 
                                               
228 See Hewitt, supra note 61, at 32. 
229 CLOSE ET AL., supra note 35, at 14. 
230 Id.   
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teachers, alerting them to investigate their practice a bit 
further. VAMs may, someday, play an important role in 
helping teachers.  
Importantly, however, the use of VAMs must be 
judicious, especially in light of their severe limitations. 
VAMs cannot tell a teacher what causes a particular 
result (the type of robust and actionable feedback a 
teacher would want) and they are highly sensitive to 
demographics and variables outside of a teacher’s control. 
Yet, because VAMs were incorporated in high-stakes 
decisions with such haste, especially with the impetus of 
the Race to the Top, they were brought to scale, warts 
and all.  
Thankfully, states have a rare opportunity in 
educational policy to take a bit more control over their 
destiny under the Every Student Succeeds Act. They 
can—and are—placing VAMs as a piece of a puzzle to 
solve teacher quality issues. Many are beginning to adopt 
laws and policies that minimize or eliminate their use in 
high-stakes employment. That is a step in the right 
direction, one that recognizes a relative value to VAMs in 
the larger quest to improve public education.  
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